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EMERGENCIES AND DEMOCRATIC FAILURE
Eric A. Posner*
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Abstract. Critics of emergency measures such as the U.S. government’s response to 9/11
invoke the Carolene Products framework, which directs courts to apply strict scrutiny to
laws and executive actions that target political or ethnic minorities. The critics suggest
that such laws and actions are usually the product of democratic failure, and are
especially likely to be so during emergencies. However, the application of the Carolene
Products framework to emergencies is questionable. Democratic failure is no more likely
during emergencies than during normal times, and courts are in a worse position to
correct democratic failures during emergencies than during normal times. The related
arguments that during emergencies courts should protect aliens, and should be more
skeptical of unilateral executive actions than of actions that are authorized by statutes, are
also of doubtful validity.
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EMERGENCIES AND DEMOCRATIC FAILURE

In recent debates about the government’s response to terrorism, and more
generally about the relationship between emergencies and constitutionalism, a prominent
argument has been that malfunctions in the political system will cause antiterror policies
to systematically harm the interests of political, ethnic or ideological minorities. Of
course in a partially majoritarian democracy, minorities will often lose. Yet those who
advance this sort of argument have something more specific in mind. Self-interested
majorities will cause government policy to provide too much security, relative to an
impartial baseline somehow defined, because those majorities do not bear the full costs of
increased security. Rather democratic majorities partially externalize the costs of
increased security onto minorities. “[A]s almost always happens, the individuals whose
rights are sacrificed are not those who make the laws, but minorities, dissidents and
noncitizens. In those circumstances, ‘we’ are making a decision to sacrifice ‘their’ rights
– not a very prudent way to balance the competing interests.”1 We dub this view and its
variants the democratic failure theory.
Rational and well-motivated governments will provide more security as threats
increase. On what grounds might one want constitutional rules to block this shift? One
class of arguments focuses on the risk that governments will act irrationally, due to panic
or other decisionmaking pathologies that afflict officials or voters. A different class of
arguments, which is our sole focus here, suggests that government will act rationally, but
not to maximize the welfare of the whole polity. Government will wholly or partially
externalize the costs of security onto nonvoters or other politically unrepresented groups.
The structure of representation will thus cause government to provide too much security,
from the social point of view.
On several counts, however, the democratic failure theory is puzzling, and our
aim here is to express skepticism about it. First, it is not clear what the account has to do
with emergency. The structures of voting and representation that are said to produce
democratic failure are the same in both emergencies and normal times. Perhaps the
emergency causes a loss for society as a whole. But it is still unclear why the new, postemergency equilibrium will be relatively worse for the minority than was the old, preemergency equilibrium; the minority should get the same proportional slice of the social
product it had before, albeit from a smaller pie. The possibility that a majority will
externalize costs onto nonvoters or other minorities is just a general structural charge
against democratic decisionmaking, one that can apply at any time, not merely in time of
emergency or terrorist threat. There is little evidence, and no theoretical reason to believe,
that democratic failure is more likely in emergencies. Indeed, there is some evidence that
minorities fare especially well in times of emergency, because government has more need
1

GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 531 (2004). Other versions of this position include Jeremy
Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 191, 194 (2003)
(expressing a worry that changes in security policy may “involve[], in effect, a proposal to trade off the
liberties of a few against the security of the majority”); David Cole, Their Liberties, Our Security:
Democracy and Double Standards, 31 Int. J. Legal Information 290, 304 (2003).
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of their contributions. Emergencies have often been an engine of progressive government
and policy reform.
Second, just as the democratic failure theory is not really tied to emergencies, so
too it does not necessarily imply that government will provide excessive security.
Political distortions may arise whenever the majority does not bear the full costs of its
policies; when this occurs, public goods will be supplied at the wrong levels. But security
is just one public good among others. Another such good is liberty, which depends upon
government provision of the public goods that protect liberty, such as law enforcement.2
It is equally consistent with the democratic failure theory that majorities will cause
government to supply excessive liberty – insufficient regulation of terrorist threats –
when majorities do not bear the full expected costs of terrorism, perhaps because those
costs are concentrated in particular areas. Majorities may externalize the costs of liberty
as well as the costs of security.
The best construal of the democratic failure theory is that it is not really about
security policy in times of emergency. On this version, the account just applies during
emergencies the standard approach of representation-reinforcing judicial review, derived
from the Carolene Products case3 and the work of John Hart Ely.4 Courts should
presumptively require government to proceed through general laws and policies, as
opposed to narrowly targeted ones. Government action directed against dissenters, the
disenfranchised, or discrete and insular groups among the citizenry should be strictly
scrutinized to smoke out animus or opportunistic scapegoating of ideological, political or
ethnic minorities, and this is true in both emergencies and normal times.
We will suggest, however, that the Carolene Products framework misfires during
times of war or other emergency, whatever its value in ordinary settings. Here aliens and
citizens present different cases. Where resident aliens and other de jure nonvoters are
concerned, there is a serious problem, well-known in democratic theory and elsewhere,
that affects the democratic failure theory. Why should the interests of resident aliens be
included in the social welfare function that, in the democratic failure theory, provides the
baseline for measuring political “distortion”? After all, many governmental decisions
affect the interests of residents of Canada, or China, despite their lack of representation in
the American political system. The puzzle is why the interests of resident aliens should
be deemed as weighty as those of citizens, while the interests of nonresident aliens need
not be. These problems exist during normal times, but are much accentuated during times
of emergency, when the status and regulation of aliens become a more pressing problem.
Where political or ethnic minorities among the citizenry are concerned, the
problem of defining the scope of the demos does not arise, but other problems remain.
When faced with government action during emergencies, the costs of the searching
judicial review recommended by Carolene Products increase, often to unacceptable
levels. Smoking out government animus or opportunism requires information the judges
do not have in times of emergency; the costs of judicial mistakes are higher, because
judicial invalidation of a policy necessary for national security may have disastrous
2

See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 50 (1999).
Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
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consequences; and the sheer delay created by vigorous judicial review is more costly as
well, because in emergencies time is typically at a premium. The judges know all this,
which is why they defer heavily to government in times of emergency, even with respect
to policies that democratic failure theorists find, in hindsight, to be infected with animus
or opportunism.
The upshot is that the Carolene Products approach should neither be accepted nor
rejected wholesale; much depends upon the political setting and upon the nature of the
groups and interests at issue. Emergencies strain the Carolene Products framework, and
in some places the framework cannot hold up. At the retail level, we will propose the
following views. (1) We will accept for the sake of argument that Carolene Products is a
sensible approach to judicial review of laws affecting citizens in normal times.5 (2) We
suggest that Carolene Products cannot justify genuine heightened scrutiny –
nondeferential review – of laws affecting citizens in times of emergency, and that the
judges will predictably refuse to engage in such scrutiny even if it were desirable. (3) We
are skeptical that Carolene Products can coherently be applied to laws affecting aliens
and other persons who are not obviously members of the political community, either in
times of emergency or in normal times. The problem of the boundaries of the political
community is, however, most serious in times of emergency, where the regulation of
aliens becomes a more pressing issue.
The article is organized as follows. Part I sets out a cost-benefit baseline for
security policy and disentangles some conceptual questions. In Part II we define
“democratic failure” and contest the assumption, common to the theories we examine,
that there is a necessary link between democratic failure and excessive security. We
suggest that the democratic failure theory cannot uniquely predict excessive government
provision of security; self-interested majorities may also provide excessive levels of other
public goods, including liberty. Just as political distortions in normal times cause policy
to supply inadequate regulation of firearms and other dangerous goods, so too in times of
emergency political distortions may cause insufficient protection of minorities’ security,
perhaps by inadequate regulation of terrorist threats whose expected costs fall
disproportionately on minorities.
Parts III and IV examine two different versions of the democratic failure theory,
which hold different views about the relationship between democratic failure and
emergencies. In the first version, democratic failure is especially likely in times of
emergency. Part III questions this view. Even on the internal logic of the theory,
democratic failure is not more likely in times of emergency. If the structure of voting and
representation cause government to act on behalf of a majority rather than on behalf of
all, this is equally true in normal times as well as during emergencies. An emergency is
just an exogenous shock that reduces the size of the social pie but that need not change
the proportions of the pie that are enjoyed by different groups. There is little historical
evidence that democratic failure is especially likely in times of emergency; to the
contrary, emergencies have often bettered the position of minorities, because government
has greater need of their political, economic and military contributions.
5

One of us has argued that Carolene Products review should not apply even in normal times. See ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
(Harvard University Press, forthcoming 2006). But we will bracket that broader position here.
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Part IV addresses a different (and in our view better) version of the democratic
failure theory. On this version, democratic failure is no more likely in emergencies than
in normal times, but no less likely either. The same Carolene Products framework that
applies during normal times applies during emergencies. General laws are presumptively
valid, because they force majorities to internalize the social costs of their actions, but
policies or laws that target racial, ethnic or political minorities should be given strict
scrutiny, and are presumptively invalid.
As against this view, we suggest that the standard Carolene Products approach
comes unglued during times of emergency. Judges face a risk of committing errors in two
directions: they may erroneously validate policies that stem from democratic failure, or
they may erroneously invalidate measures necessary for national security. The risks and
costs of the first type of error are constant across both normal times and emergencies, but
in emergencies the risks and costs of the second type of error spike upward. In times of
emergency, the judges’ information is especially poor, their ability to sort justified from
unjustified policies especially limited, and the cost of erroneously blocking necessary
security measures may be disastrous. Included among those costs is the cost of delay,
which amounts to a temporary blockage of new policies, and which is especially serious
during emergencies, where time is all. In general, the difference in the stakes between
emergencies and normal times makes the limited capacities of judges decisive. The
judges themselves have typically recognized this.
These institutional points apply to both citizens and aliens, but Part IV also
considers the distinctive problems that resident aliens pose for the democratic failure
theory. We suggest that resident aliens are if anything less likely to be subjected to
arbitrary discrimination than are discrete and insular subgroups among the citizenry. If
aliens lack the vote, they possess an exit option that citizens realistically do not; the
structure of the international order will constrain majoritarian oppression of aliens; and
aliens’ welfare will itself be a component of the majority’s welfare, which government is
assumed to maximize on the democratic failure theory. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE DEMOCRATIC FAILURE THEORY
We begin by setting forth a simple account that typically serves as the implicit foil
for the democratic failure theory. We assume that there is a basic tradeoff between
security and liberty.6 Both are valuable goods that contribute to social welfare, so neither
good can simply be maximized without regard to the other. Of course, at certain levels,
security and liberty are complements as well as substitutes. Liberty cannot be enjoyed
without security, and security is not worth enjoying without liberty. And there is
something like a Pareto frontier for liberty and security; in some situations rational
6

Waldron offers a series of cautions about this assumption. Most importantly, Waldron cautions that
“diminishing liberty might also diminish security against the state, even as it enhances security against
terrorism,” Waldron, supra, at 195, and that a proposal may “trade off the liberties of a few against the
security of the majority.” The latter point is the focus of our argument. The former point identifies a cost of
increasing security, and is thus internal to the tradeoff we assume. More generally, Waldron expresses
skepticism about the tradeoff assumption, but the cautions he supplies just identify considerations that can
be folded into the balancing analysis, as we do throughout.
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policymakers can increase security at no cost to liberty, or increase liberty at no cost to
security. But it is plausible to assume that advanced liberal democracies are typically at
or near the frontier already. In their circumstances, an appreciable increase in security
will require some decrease in liberty, and vice-versa.7 The problem from the social point
of view is one of optimization: it is to choose the point along the frontier that maximizes
the joint benefits of security and liberty. (Here and later we bracket and ignore all of the
well-known problems with aggregative social welfare functions that compare goods
across persons). Neither security nor liberty is lexically prior; no claims of the type
“liberty is priceless” or “security at all costs” will be admitted.
Suppose then that government is both rational and well motivated. Rational here
just means that the government makes no systematic errors in assessing the likely effects
of increases or decreases in security and liberty. Although government makes mistakes,
those mistakes are randomly distributed; thus government’s assessments are correct on
average. Well-motivated means that the government acts so as to maximize the welfare of
all persons properly included in the social welfare function. This formulation is
deliberately vague, because we bracket for now the problem of whose welfare, exactly,
should enter into the social welfare function. In Part IV we examine more and less
expansive views on this question: perhaps the welfare only of citizens should be taken
into account, or of citizens plus resident aliens, or of all persons affected by government
policies wherever they reside.
How will a rational and well-motivated government respond to terrorist threats?
As the benefits of security increase due to exogenous threats such as terrorism, a wellfunctioning government will supply more security and less liberty, because the value
gained from the increase in security will exceed the losses from the decrease in liberty.
Again, government may make mistakes, but is no more likely to make mistakes about
security policy than it is about more routine business, and there will be no predictable or
systematic skew in governmental decisionmaking.
If this simple picture is right, then it is hopeless for judges to attempt to secondguess government security policy. In particular cases judges may do better than
government at assessing the relative likelihood of threats to security and liberty, or the
overall costs of particular policies. But this will be wholly fortuitous, and judges who
think they have guessed better may guess worse instead. Judges are generalists, and the
political insulation that protects them from current politics also deprives them of
information,8 especially information about novel threats and necessary responses to those
threats. If government can make mistakes, adopting unjustified security measures, judges
can make mistakes as well, sometimes invalidating justified security measures. If the
simple picture is correct, there is no general reason to think that judges can do better than
government at balancing security and liberty. Constitutional rules do no good, and some
7

We assume a budget constraint. We assume, in other words, that the courts cannot simply order the
government to spend more money in order to enhance liberty (for example, more elaborate procedures at
airports that do not unduly delay travelers) without reducing security. This never seems to be an issue in the
cases, perhaps because courts recognize that more expensive measures are not politically feasible, so that
the actual effect of such an order would be to reduce security.
8
See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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harm, if they block government’s attempts to adjust the balance as threats wax and wane.
When judges or academic commentators say that government has wrongly assessed the
net benefits or costs of some security policy or other, they are amateurs playing at
security policy, and if government’s decisionmaking is undistorted, then there is no
reason to expect that it can be bettered in any systematic way.
But of course the commentators frequently deny that the simple picture we have
set out is correct. The basic claim is the government’s decisionmaking is subject to
systematic distortions of cognition (including emotional reactions) or of motivation.
Commentators either deny that government acts rationally, deny that it acts as a wellmotivated decisionmaker, or deny both assumptions.
One class of arguments denies that government chooses policies rationally; we
label this the panic account.9 Government officials panic, or else government officials are
rational but act as tightly constrained agents who supply the irrational policies that
panicked constituents demand. Some versions of the panic account center on the role of
emotions, such as fear, in governmental decisionmaking; some are more strictly
cognitive, focusing on heuristics and biases such as availability; some emphasize social
influences, such as herding and group polarization. In any of these versions, however, the
panic account holds that government does not form accurate (on average) assessments of
threats, and will thus provide excessive security.
In other work, we have expressed skepticism about the panic account, on several
grounds.10 Fear can improve decisionmaking as well as hamper it, because fear supplies
motivation that can overcome preexisting inertia. In some circumstances fear can even
sharpen the assessment of threats. Cognitive failings and social influences have no
inherent valence; although they are capable of generating security panics, which cause
government to supply excessive security, they are equally capable of generating
libertarian panics, which cause government to supply inadequate security measures. In
any event, there is no class of decisionmakers who can be insulated from panic at
acceptable cost, not even judges.
Here we focus on a different class of arguments, the democratic failure theory.
This account differs from the panic account because it accepts that government officials
are rational, and act as agents for a majority of citizen-voters who are also rational. (Later
we discuss the possibility that officials enjoy agency slack). What is distinctive is a
further assumption: the citizen-voters are not only rational, but self-interested, and this
causes their governmental agents to supply security policies that benefit the majority at
the expense of political, ideological or ethnic minorities. Government chooses security
policy rationally, but its goal is to maximize the welfare of current democratic majorities,
rather than the overall welfare of the polity. From the social point of view, government
acts rationally but not in a well-motivated fashion.
There are several important variants of this theory. One dimension of variation
involves the identity of the relevant majorities and minorities. Sometimes “the majority”
refers to political majorities in a strict sense: citizens, who are also voters, make up the
9

See STONE, supra; Cass R. Sunstein, Fear and Liberty, 71 SOCIAL RESEARCH 967 (2004).
See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003);
Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (2005).
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majority, and those who cannot vote make up the minority. Although the class of nonvoters includes some citizens, such as children and (in some states) ex-felons, the
emphasis in this version is typically upon resident aliens, illegal immigrants, and other
outsider groups who are formally barred from the franchise. Here an important claim is
that security policy after 9/11 has imposed large and differential burdens upon aliens and
immigrants; according to this view, the disenfranchisement of these groups ensures that
majoritarian politics will not adequately represent their interests. The voting majority
instead externalizes all or part of the costs of security. For examples, consider the
detention of illegal immigrants on security grounds;11 the Presidential order establishing
military commissions, which applied only to non-citizens;12 the Patriot Act’s special
provisions for noncitizens;13 and the treatment of aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay.14
In another version, “minority” refers to some ethnic or racial minority, such as
Arab-Americans, and the “majority” refers (usually implicitly) to whites. Here the claim,
although usually implicit, is that ethnic minorities are formally entitled to vote, but lack
effective political power, ensuring that democratic decisionmaking will not adequately
weigh their interests. After 9/11, on this view, new security policies have imposed
differential burdens on minorities. Consider the claim that federal officials have been
engaging in ethnic profiling in airport screening and other security-related searches,15 or
the inclusion of some Arab-Americans in the FBI’s program of interviewing “persons of
interest” who might pose security risks.16 The sometime emphasis on ethnic minorities
blurs the boundaries between the panic account and the democratic failure theory. To the
extent that security policies such as ethnic profiling are said to embody invidious
discrimination, rather than statistically rational discrimination, then democratic failure
may stem from irrational standing passions and ethnic animus.
There is some overlap between these two versions of the democratic failure
theory. Important policies after 9/11 have applied only to non-citizens, yet within that
category have focused on ethnic minorities. Examples include the special registration
program, now defunct, which required aliens in the United States from a designated list
of (almost exclusively) Muslim nations to register with the INS; the Absconder Initiative,
under which aliens from nations with substantial Al Qaeda presence were targeted for
removal; and Operation Liberty Shield, which subjects asylum applicants from such
nations to mandatory detentions.17 Such programs combine selective regulation of noncitizens with selective regulation of Arabs or Muslims or both.

11

See Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-terrorism Tool; Use of charges to detain or deport
suspects criticized by Muslim groups, Wash. Post, June 13, 2005, at A1.
12
See Tim Golden, U.S. Is Examining Plan to Bolster Detainee Rights, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2005, at A1.
13
See Daphne Eviatar, Foreigners’ Rights in the Post-9/11 Era: A Matter of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, October
4, 2003, at B7.
14
See Neil A. Lewis, Guantanamo Prisoners Seek to See Families and Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, December 3,
2002, at A22.
15
See Laurie Goodstein, A Nation Challenged: Civil Rights; American Sikhs Contend They Have Become a
Focus of Profiling at Airports, N.Y. TIMES, November 10, 2001, at B6.
16
See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Holds Virginia Man After Taping at Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, August 25, 2004, at
A14.
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Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 413-14 (2004).
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If the diagnosis is democratic failure, what is the prescription? Either in the case
of non-citizen non-voters such as resident or temporary aliens, or in the case of dissenters
or ethnic minorities among the citizenry, the democratic failure theory applies or adapts
to emergencies the idea of representation-reinforcing judicial review of democratic
decisionmaking, stemming from the Carolene Products case18 and from the work of John
Hart Ely.19 If government cannot be trusted to engage in ordinary balancing of security
and liberty, because systematic distortions produce excessive levels of security, judges
should develop rules that produce a kind of second-order balancing.20 The aim of these
second-order rules is to push governmental decisions on the security-liberty tradeoff back
towards the optimum. One prescription is prophylactic overprotection of free speech,
although this is typically tied to the panic account, which supposes that emergencies will
produce a “pathological perspective”21 that causes government officials to overregulate
political speech. For the democratic failure theory, the crucial prescription is generality:
laws must apply generally to all affected classes of citizens or persons, in order to ensure
that majorities do not impose selective burdens that voters would be unwilling to bear
themselves.22 In Justice Jackson’s words, “there is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”23 In our
terms, generality ensures that democratic majorities internalize the costs of government
policies.
It is not clear, however, what the Carolene Products framework has to do with
emergencies; it is a standard framework for judicial review in normal times on purely
domestic issues. Theories of democratic failure often leave the connections among
emergencies, democracy and Carolene Products review unspecified or opaque. We may
distinguish three possible views, as follows:
(1) Judicial review should be stricter in emergencies than in normal times. This is
a straightforward entailment of the panic account, which theorists frequently run together
with the democratic failure theory. In the pure form of the democratic failure theory,
however, it is unclear why democratic failure should be more worrisome in times of
emergency. The basic mechanism of democratic failure – the mismatch between formal
voting rights or de facto political influence, on the one hand, and the population whose
welfare government should promote, on the other – exists both in emergencies and in
normal times. Democratic failure theorists seem to worry that majorities will scapegoat
minorities during emergencies or seize on the emergency to harm minorities in

18

Carolene Products, supra.
ELY, supra.
20
Sunstein, supra, at 984.
21
See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449
(1985)
22
See FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROGER D.
CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT INTEREST: TOWARDS NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47; Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259 (2002).
23
Railway Express Agency v. People of State of New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
19
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opportunistic fashion, but that worry lacks a direct connection to the mechanisms of
distortion that these theorists typically adduce. We expand upon these puzzles in Part III.
(2) Judicial review should be equally strict in emergencies and in normal times.
This does not follow from the panic view, which supposes that governmental
decisionmaking suffers from special distortions in times of emergency. The democratic
failure theory might best be understood to adopt this position, however; the account
would cheerfully concede that there is nothing special about emergencies. It is just that
the same representation-reinforcing approach that always applies, still applies in times of
emergency. We suggest in Part IV that this is the best version of the democratic failure
theory. But if it is, then democratic failure is not a distinctive lens through which to view
security policy.
(3) Judicial review should be less strict, more accommodating or deferential, in
emergencies than in normal times. Courts cannot systematically improve upon
government’s first-order balancing of security and liberty. Whatever hope they have of
doing so in normal times, as in ordinary criminal settings where security and liberty trade
off against each other, is dramatically attenuated during times of emergency, because the
judges’ information is especially poor and the costs of judicial mistakes are especially
high.
Our view is that position (3) is correct and that positions (1) and (2) are wrong.
One might claim that this view attacks a straw man. On this claim, even the most
vociferous critics of judicial passivity during emergencies agree that judges should be
more deferential during emergencies than during normal times; the critics’ complaint is
only that judges go too far, and are more deferential than circumstances warrant. We
agree that this is a possible reading of the critics, though they are hardly clear on this
point. However, their relentless assault on past judicial practice suggests that if they do
think judges should be more deferential during emergencies than during normal times,
then they believe that emergency-level deference should still be extremely low. Our view,
by contrast, is that emergency-level deference should be extremely high. It is impossible
to quantify this difference, or describe it with specificity, of course; but the practical
implications are clear. The critics think that history shows that judges have exercised too
much deference; we think that history shows that judges have acted correctly. The critics
urge judges to strike down post-9/11 Bush administration policies; we think that judges
should defer, as they always have done, though we have no view about whether these
policies are correct.
Note that the strictness of judicial review refers to the actual level of deference to
government that judges afford, rather than to the nominal rules of scrutiny that judges
employ. We may illustrate with the case of nongeneral laws that impose differential
burdens on ethnic minorities or aliens. Suppose that judges apply some form of strict or at
least heightened scrutiny to such laws in normal times, but admit an exception for cases
in which government has an especially important or compelling interest. In times of
emergency, judges might say either that nongeneral laws receive reduced scrutiny, or that
nongeneral laws are to receive the “same” heightened scrutiny that they would receive in
normal times. But even the latter position could be compatible with increased deference
to government, if judges recognize a broader range of compelling government interests in
emergencies than in normal times. In what follows, we will focus solely on the
11

operational level of judicial deference to government, which may be either high or low,
rather than on the nominal rules. In our terminology, to increase the range of interests that
count as compelling, or to decrease the weight of interests counted as compelling,
amounts to increasing the deference that is afforded to government.
For completeness, we will mention several further complications surrounding the
democratic failure theory. The first issue involves the standard question whether
democratic failure should be measured against a welfarist baseline or against some
nonwelfarist theory of rights. We will largely ignore this complication; for simplicity, we
have stated the democratic failure argument in welfarist terms. This need not be a
sectarian or contentious assumption, nor does it produce a major distortion of the
arguments. For one thing, rights are themselves an important component of welfare; more
importantly, the differences between welfarist and nonwelfarist accounts of rights are not
relevant to the issues we discuss. Differences between foundational theories of rights
rarely make a difference to the institutional issues surrounding emergencies and
democratic failure, so our welfarist statement of the theory is just an expository
convenience.
Second, the democratic failure theory is sometimes combined with a concern
about the ratchet effects of security policies. “The argument that we are only targeting
aliens’ rights, and therefore citizens need not worry, is in an important sense illusory, for
what we do to aliens today provides a precedent for what can and will be done to citizens
tomorrow.”24 The panic account is also (sometimes) combined with the ratchet concern.
We have criticized that concern elsewhere, because ratchet accounts typically lack any
mechanism that makes policies spill over into new areas or that makes them stick after
the emergency has passed, and because there is no evidence for ratchets in the history of
American security policy.25 We will ignore the ratchet issue here.
Third, some strands of the democratic failure theory emphasize that laws and
policies should be “general.” Is this the same as the Carolene Products approach? We
will treat praise for generality as a minor variant of Carolene Products. "Generality"
cannot be taken literally; a statute that applies only to a very small class C is fine, not
even presumptively bad, so long as there is some normatively valid reason to target C.
The rationale for the classification is still general, in the sense that it would apply to
anyone similarly situated. (The Supreme Court once said that a statute applying only to
Richard Nixon defined "a legitimate class of one."26). “Generality,” by itself, has no
normative appeal: “[r]acial, religious and all manner of discrimination are not only
compatible [with] but often institutionalized by general rules.”27 The question is what
counts as a valid reason for targeting or selectively burdening a subgroup, and the appeal
to "generality" does not help with that question. The real worry is that the relevant class
will be defined along prejudiced or invidious lines, according to some entirely
independent theory of prejudice or invidiousness. A theory of judicial review under
which judges should ensure the generality of laws and policies is either untenable, or else
24
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morphs into a theory of judicial review that aims to weed out prejudiced or invidious
laws and policies. That is the core of the Carolene Products enterprise, which we
examine below.
Finally, just as either the panic account or the democratic failure theory can be
combined with a concern about ratchets, so too either account can be combined with a
concern about agency slack between voting majorities and government officials. With
respect to the panic account, consider the suggestion that security panics are produced by
self-interested security entrepreneurs: government officials and interest groups who whip
up security panics for political advantage.28 The microfoundations of the account are
typically left unspecified. How exactly does expanding the power of the governmental
security apparatus personally benefit self-seeking officials and groups?29 And it seems
equally possible that officials, candidates for office, and interest groups may act as selfinterested libertarian entrepreneurs -- we might think of the ACLU and Michael Moore
most recently – who whip up a libertarian scare, exaggerating reports of governmental
intrusion in order to establish a public climate that is hostile to governmental power, to
oust a disfavored incumbent, or to increase membership and donations. Most simply,
however, it is not clear that this variant adds very much to the panic account. Either
democratic majorities panic and constrain their agents to adopt panicky policies, or
autonomous officials whip up panics among a pliable populace; either way, the important
point is that policies are biased towards excessive security.
There is a similar variant of the democratic failure theory. Instead of emphasizing
cost-externalization by self-interested majorities acting through tightly constrained
agents, one might emphasize the risk that officials who enjoy agency slack will
opportunistically promote their individual or institutional interests; perhaps such officials
would even use their freedom to harm political or ethnic minorities. Here too it is not
clear how much this variant adds. If the principal worry is that autonomous officials will
scapegoat minorities to augment their individual or institutional power, then the
presupposition must be that there is some pre-existing susceptibility to political or ethnic
hatred among the population, and it does not very much matter whether that hatred vents
itself through majorities acting through their agents or through autonomous officials
generating or exploiting the hatred for self-interested reasons. Either way, excessive
security is the problem, not the precise mechanism that produces it; and in any event the
focus on popular emotions shades back into the panic account again. In what follows, we
will note these shadings and variants when relevant, but will focus principally on the
most straightforward version of the democratic failure theory, under which rationally
self-interested officials act as agents for rationally self-interested majorities.
II. DEFINING DEMOCRATIC FAILURE
What exactly is a “democratic failure”? In Section A, we offer a simple definition
that is implicitly presupposed by the theories we examine. In Section B, we suggest that
democratic failure theories focus too narrowly on the risk that government will
28
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excessively reduce the liberties of minorities while providing too much security to the
public. In fact, the democratic failure theory does not necessarily predict that government
will supply too much security. It is equally possible, given the theory, that a government
pandering to self-interested majorities will supply minorities with too much liberty, or
inadequate security.
A. “Democratic Failure”
To identify a democratic failure, one needs to know what counts as a “democratic
success.” In welfarist terms, the following benchmark is common.30 Imagine a society
with a political system that implements policies that affect the welfare of citizens. Certain
policies would, if implemented, be Pareto-improving: they would make at least one
person better off while making no one else worse off. The political system either does or
does not implement these policies. If it does, there is a democratic success; if it does not,
there is a democratic failure.
The Pareto standard is too austere for a real government, however. Virtually no
policy can survive that standard. We might, then, define success more loosely: a success
occurs when laws are passed that enhance overall welfare. A democratic failure occurs
when such laws are not passed, or laws are passed that reduce overall welfare. Defining a
social welfare function that aggregates across persons is notoriously difficult31 – that is
why the conceptually simpler Pareto standard is usually used in the literature – but we
will stipulate, roughly, that overall welfare increases when a project makes nearly
everyone better off and virtually no one worse off, or a substantial number of people
significantly better off at the expense of a relatively small number of people who are
made only trivially worse off.32
Why might a political system implement a policy that fails to maximize overall
welfare or that even reduces overall welfare? There are many possible answers to this
question. One answer focuses on the risks of majoritarianism: if the government is
elected by majority rule, and wishes to be reelected by the same majority, it will be in the
interest of the government to pass laws that benefit the majority, even if those laws inflict
greater harms upon the minority. But there are other, nonmajoritarian theories of
democratic failure as well. In Part I we mentioned agency-cost theories, which hold that
governments – including elected officials and bureaucrats – choose policies that favor
their own interests or ideologies, or the interests of supporters, at the expense of the
majority; because the majority cannot perfectly monitor the government’s activities, the
government has freedom to use public resources for private interests. These theories
come in many different flavors. Some scholars emphasize the perverse incentives of
30
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bureaucracies.33 Others argue that governments favor organized interest groups such as
trade organizations and unions at the expense of the majority; these groups pool resources
to lobby the government, while the majority is diffuse and unorganized.34 A third group
focuses on problems created by asymmetric information;35 a fourth on commitment
problems.36 There are also various theories that focus on the difficulties of aggregating
preferences in a way that produces consistent, nonarbitrary social choices.37
These theories have had less influence on the mainstream constitutional law
literature than has the majoritarian version of democratic failure theory. There are two
reasons for this. First, the agency-cost theories lack solid empirical foundations and have
ambiguous implications for evaluation of law and policy.38 Second, the theories do not
imply that judges, even well motivated judges who seek to act in the public interest, can
solve the democratic failures that the theories identify.
The second problem is the one we focus on. The problem is that even if judges are
well motivated, it is unlikely that they have the institutional capacity to correct the
failures predicted by agency-cost theories. Consider, for example, the interest group
approach, which suggests that virtually all laws reflect the influence of interest groups.
The implication of the theory is that courts should scrutinize all laws to smoke out
socially harmful rent-seeking, a task that modern courts are unwilling and unable to
execute, and have not since the New Deal.39 It has been suggested that courts might
restrict the influence of interest groups by employing proxies, such as a rule of thumb that
laws providing concentrated benefits and dispersed costs harm diffuse majorities more
than they benefit well-organized minorities, and therefore should be struck down.40 Yet
the proxy is too crude. Laws that provide concentrated benefits and dispersed costs will
often increase overall welfare, if the beneficiaries of the redistribution have a higher
marginal utility for income than does the majority, or if the beneficiaries are being given
incentives to provide social goods. Laws and projects as diverse as Social Security
(which benefits the elderly) and funding of basic research (which benefits universities)
would be suspect. Experience has taught us that courts are in no position to evaluate such
33
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laws for impermissible interest group influence. The same reasoning applies to the other
types of agency cost theories.
As for the social choice paradoxes, they are mostly a theoretical possibility; it is
not at all clear that they materialize in real-world legislative institutions.41 Whatever the
case, the problem with these theories is that they either suggest that government policy
cycles arbitrarily, in which case a court could do nothing to improve the situation, or that
policies will be dictated by a self-interested agenda-setter, which is just a version of the
agency-slack theory. For these reasons, we will downplay the competing accounts of
democratic failure and confine our attention to the most straightforward, majoritarian
version of democratic failure theory.
For all its problems, the majoritarian version of the democratic failure theory – the
Carolene Products version – does not seem as vulnerable to objection as the agency cost
and social choice versions. The reason is probably that the majoritarian version is
compatible with a moderate role for the courts, one to which we are accustomed. Not all
laws are the result of democratic failures, thus courts need not scrutinize every law that is
passed. Only certain types of laws – those that are not general but that target a discrete
and insular minority – need to be scrutinized. The burden placed on courts thus seems
reasonable. In addition, the theory seems plausible – or, at least, has been considered
plausible by many constitutional law scholars – even if it relies on a simplistic conception
of democratic politics, as we discuss in Part III. The notion that majorities exploit
minorities has an extremely long intellectual pedigree, is reflected in American
constitutional history going back to the founding, and, in particular, seems to have been
spectacularly confirmed by the history of race relations in the United States. For all these
reasons, we will focus, for the most part, on the majoritarian version of the democratic
failure theory.
B. Democratic Failure, Security and Liberty
If there is a democratic failure of the majoritarian sort, how will the majority
accomplish its ends? Here we suggest that the democratic failure theory has no intrinsic
connection to security. In particular, the theory cannot uniquely predict that government
will provide excessive security and insufficient liberty. Given the structural premises of
the account, it is equally possible that government will provide minorities with
inadequate security, or excessive liberty.
Recall the simple view sketched in Part I, according to which government
supplies some mix of security and liberty. Failure theorists emphasize the risk that
majorities will cause government to supply too much security, because they do not bear
the full costs of security. But the mechanism of democratic cost-externalization is pitched
at too high a level of abstraction to produce the conclusion that failure theorists want to
reach. If the structure of the political system allows democratic majorities to externalize
costs onto minorities and outsiders, they may externalize any sort of cost, not merely the
41
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costs of purchasing security. In particular, it is quite possible that democratic majorities
will externalize the costs of liberty onto minority and outsider groups, purchasing too
little security because majorities do not bear the full costs of insecurity.
Majority-dominated governments have a range of policy instruments at their
disposal: direct regulation, taxation, and spending, among others. Theorists of democratic
failure focus on the dangers of regulation, in particular the danger that regulation will
impose excessive security restrictions on minorities in order to benefit majorities. Yet
when other instruments are brought into the picture, it is clear that majorities can exploit
minorities, in the sense of exploitation we have defined above, through other instruments
as well, and in ways that need not yield excessive security. In addition to regulation,
taxation might explicitly or implicitly take from minorities to benefit majorities. Less
intuitively, majorities might exploit minorities through regulation or spending that
insufficiently protects minorities’ security, relative to the welfarist baseline.
We may begin with some analogies from normal times and from purely domestic
policy settings. Consider the claim, in debates over criminal-justice policy, that the
political system invests too little in protecting minority communities from crime,
especially in urban areas. “[T]o the extent that crime victims, or those who live in fear of
becoming crime victims, are diffuse and poorly organized, and to the extent that a large
part of the population need not share the fear that these victims bear, crime losses may be
undervalued by local and state authorities, and are certainly undervalued by federal
government officials.”42 A less qualified version of the claim would run as follows. The
costs of crime are borne disproportionately by minorities who live in urban areas. Yet
those minorities lack a full measure of political influence, as compared to affluent
libertarians who support expansive definitions of constitutional rights – rights that protect
the criminals who prey upon minority communities. The affluent libertarians do not bear
anything like the full costs of crime, and thus support a more expansive scheme of civil
liberties than would be produced if poor minority communities had proportionate
influence in the political system.
Another possible example involves government (under)regulation of firearms.
Rural voters who use firearms for hunting and other purposes might object to government
regulation of firearms even if increased regulation would be beneficial from the social
point of view. The rural voters who block firearms regulation do not bear the full social
costs of gun violence, which are partially externalized onto city dwellers. This is not
solely a just-so story; there is some evidence that, whatever the prevalence of symbolic
politics in other domains, voters act in strictly self-interested fashion where firearms
regulation is concerned,43 and voters in southern and western states are much more likely
to oppose gun control than voters in states such as California and New York.44
The common theme in these examples is that the political system shoves off the
costs of liberty onto a subset of the community that lacks a full share of political power.
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The same mechanism might operate in the terrorism context. Consider the possibility that
majorities who live outside of the large urban areas that are the best target for terrorism
will cause the political system to invest too little in terrorism prevention, because they do
not bear the full expected costs of terrorist threats. One possibility is that the red-state
voters who supported the Republican party in 2000 and 2004 might cause the national
political process to provide inadequate security for blue-state urban centers. Consider that
a large share of federal block grants for terrorism prevention go to rural western states,45
whereas a rational policy would, as a first approximation, spend zero dollars protecting
such areas.46 Too little is being spent on security in the most threatened areas, and too
much in the least threatened areas.
The misallocation of terrorism funding no doubt represents an example of the
allocative distortions produced by the Senate’s geographical basis of representation. But
that is the point: if the structure of Senate representation causes political distortions, those
distortions have no particular valence with respect to the tradeoff between security and
liberty. Political distortions may produce excessive liberty in some domains as well as
excessive security in others. Moreover, the political distortions of terrorism policy go
beyond appropriations to include regulation. Consider the concern that federal inspection
of cargo containers entering large urban ports is insufficiently vigorous,47 perhaps
because such ports, although among the areas most threatened by terrorism, are not part
of the red-state coalition.
Stories of this sort may be true or false. The point is that there is no general reason
to think that cost-externalization systematically tilts in the direction of producing too
much security, rather than too much liberty. Security is a public good. But there are many
other public goods, including freedom from private violence, which must be protected
and supported by government expenditures on security and order.48 Whatever the optimal
supply of public goods at a given time, and whatever political forces produce the actual
supply at a given time, the appeal to democratic cost-externalization is compatible with
insufficient as well as excessive security.
We have not yet said anything about judicial review, a topic we defer to Parts III
and IV. Suppose that democratic failure can produce either excessive security or
excessive liberty; perhaps it even produces both, at different times, in different places, or
on different policy dimensions. Democratic failure theorists can sensibly say that courts
should police both forms of democratic failure. Courts should police excessive provision
of security by government, when that occurs; it is neither here nor there that government
45
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can also supply inadequate protection to minorities. Courts might also police the latter,
perhaps under the rubric of “equal protection of the laws,” whose core historical meaning
encompasses governmental failure to protect minorities from third-party harms.
In practice, however, it is striking that democratic failure theorists say little or
nothing about the problem of excessive liberty. No theorist has suggested that courts
should reallocate anti-terrorism appropriations to beef up the security apparatus where it
is most needed, or should second-guess the government’s policies for protecting bluestate ports from terrorist attack. The reason, presumably, is that judicial review of this
sort would prove infeasible, and possibly counterproductive. Courts might suspect
democratic failure in the underprovision of security to minorities, but would be hardpressed to know what the optimal arrangements would be, and hard-pressed to enforce
those arrangements even if they were known; government might circumvent the courts’
decisions by reallocating funding on other margins, or simply by ignoring them.
There are two lessons here, which we draw out in Part IV. First, the same
problems of judicial capacity that constrain judicial review of inadequate security also
constrain judicial review of excessive security. The courts’ institutional capacities are the
same, whatever the mechanism of democratic failure. Thus, if critics of judicial deference
do not believe courts should scrutinize laws that enhance liberty during times of
emergency – such as the provisions of the Patriot Act that strengthen privacy protections
– they need to explain what it is about security-enhancing laws that justifies special
judicial scrutiny. Second, systemic effects and dynamic governmental responses also
undercut judicial review of policies that impose excessive security. If courts police
policies that produce excessive security but not policies that produce excessive liberty,
government may tend to substitute the latter type of exploitation for the former. Here we
merely note these problems of judicial capacities and systemic effects.49 Part IV
elaborates these points into an argument against Carolene Products review during times
of emergency.
III. DEMOCRATIC FAILURE AND EMERGENCIES
We turn now to a critique of the two main versions of the democratic failure
theory. In this Part, we criticize the version which holds that democratic failure is more
likely, or more damaging, in emergencies than in normal times, so that judicial review
must be more strict during emergencies.50 Part IV turns to the view that democratic
failure is equally likely in normal times and in emergencies, so that judicial review must
at least be equally strict in both settings. In Part IV we also give affirmative arguments
for our alternative view, which is that judicial review should be more deferential in
emergencies than in normal times, even where facially discriminatory laws are at issue.
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Section A examines the principal approach to judicial review that democratic
failure theorists endorse: the Carolene Products theory. Surprisingly, the literature is
barren of efforts to model Carolene Products review. This is not the place to attempt our
own model; thus, we will confine ourselves to some conceptual observations that set up
the subsequent analysis. In Section B, we suggest that neither democratic failure theory
generally, nor Carolene Products review in particular, can logically be tied to emergency.
The structural mechanisms that are said to produce failures, primarily the structure of
voting and representation, operate equally in emergencies and in normal times; nor is
there historical evidence that democratic failures are systematically more likely, or more
harmful, in emergencies. To the contrary, we examine mechanisms and evidence
suggesting that emergencies often improve the political and economic position of
minorities.
A. The Carolene Products Theory
The Carolene Products theory, unlike the agency-cost theories of democratic
failure canvassed in II.A, appears to have straightforward normative implications and
straightforward implications for the role of courts. If majorities exploit minorities by
enacting laws that target the minorities, then courts should have a preference for general
laws, which require the self-interested majority to internalize costs. Courts should be less
deferential toward targeted laws than toward general laws.
But the concern that self-interested majorities will impose excessive costs on
targeted minorities is itself ambiguous. Virtually all laws, taken in isolation, harm a
minority of the population: gas taxes save energy but hurt poor people who drive a great
deal; gun control laws save lives but harm people who need guns to protect themselves;
environmental laws protect the environment but may harm people who hold certain jobs;
and so forth. Thus, the Carolene Products theory assumes that a law cannot be evaluated
in isolation.51 A law that benefits a majority while injuring a minority may be acceptable
as long as it is not the case that the political process generates only (or mostly) laws that
have a similar effect. Rather, a well-functioning political process sometimes produces
laws that benefit any given minority. Because different coalitions assemble on different
issues, there are no groups who are repeat losers or structurally disfavored minorities.
This is probably why Carolene Products refers not to any minority, but to (1) a
“discrete and insular minority” that (2) is historically oppressed because of (3)
“prejudice.”52 The people who belong to a discrete and insular minority that is
historically oppressed are likely to be in the political minority always or almost always,
rather than in a political minority sometimes but in a political majority at other times. By
contrast, the Carolene Products theory imagines that majority prejudice bars minorities,
especially African-Americans, from joining the winning coalition on issue after issue –
tax policy, education policy, defense policy, and so forth. We can say that a law reflects a
democratic failure when (1) the benefit to the majority is less than the loss to the
51
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minority, or (2) the benefit to the majority is more than the loss to the minority on a
particular law, but the members of the minority rarely find themselves in winning
coalitions, so that their losses from the political process over some lengthy period of time
exceed their gains.
Carolene Products does not say that courts will evaluate every law, and reject all
laws that are democratic failures as defined above. The problem is one of institutional
capacity: courts are not in a good position to evaluate the gains and losses from a law. In
a world in which African-Americans are poorer on average than whites, any nonprogressive form of taxation might be said to be a democratic failure, according to our
revised definition; determining whether this is the case would require a very complicated
evaluation of people’s preferences, people’s views about the proper distribution of
wealth, and so forth.
Given their limited capacities, courts cannot conduct such an analysis. Rather,
they presume that laws that explicitly burden African-Americans are democratic failures,
and laws that do not are not democratic failures. The implicit logic is that facial
discrimination is a proxy for democratic failure. When there is no facial discrimination,
and no other obvious indication of discrimination such as evidence of overt racial animus
in the legislative history, most of the time no democratic failure has occurred. The
distinction between general and targeted laws is a rough-and-ready means to measure
whether the majority shares in the law’s burdens, and thus internalizes the law’s social
cost.
There are many standard criticisms of the Carolene Products approach, even in
ordinary times.53 First, its assumption that majorities exploit minorities, in the sense of
exploitation described in Part II, does not have a sound theoretical foundation. As we
mentioned above, a contrary thesis is that minorities exploit majorities. Public choice
theory suggests that interest groups sometimes cause governments to adopt policies that
transfer wealth from the diffuse and unorganized majority to a well organized minority.54
Public choice theory has many problems, but it surely reflects an important truth,
especially when minorities are in a defensive rather than offensive position,55 and can
benefit from blocking legislation that would benefit the majority even more. Similarly,
we might expect discrete and insular minorities to organize and form groups that exercise
disproportionate political power.
Second, Carolene Products assumes that the majority is monolithic, when in fact
policy is created by shifting majorities that comprise diverse groups.56 The Carolene
Products theory implicitly assumed a very crude story, in which a majority of whites
oppress a minority of African-Americans. This story simplifies unacceptably. White
liberals, workers, government employees, and urban dwellers often find themselves in
coalitions with African-American civil rights proponents, workers, government
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employees, and urban dwellers, because their interests converge with respect to discrete
issues. But if the story did contain some truth in the past, it is even less plausible in the
present, and in the context of the 9/11 emergency. Jose Padilla is a Hispanic, yet there
was no effort to target Hispanics after his arrest, in part because Hispanics as a group
have shown no general disposition to support al Qaeda, but also because Hispanics have
considerable political power. So do Arab-Americans, who occupy a swing state in
presidential elections.57
Third, Carolene Products assumes that people in the majority do not care about
the well-being of people in the minority. This assumption may, again, have been a rough
truth in the past, when whites and African-Americans were segregated and mutually
hostile. But, today, thanks in part to civil rights laws and perhaps even to the Carolene
Products line of cases, the population is much more integrated. Although residential
segregation persists, there is much more intermarriage between whites, on the one hand,
and Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and even African-Americans, on the other hand.
Educational, class, and wealth differences do not overlap with racial and ethnic
differences to the extent that they once did. African-Americans remain a special case, but
no one thinks that post-9/11 emergency regulation should target African-Americans. If
people are less likely to support laws that discriminate against their spouses, children,
relatives, coworkers, and neighbors, then the risk of democratic failure at the expense of
ethnic or racial minorities is lower than it used to be. On this picture, judicial review
according to Carolene Products may itself have undermined the very conditions that
originally made it an attractive approach.
Our purpose here, however, is not to criticize Carolene Products generally, but to
focus on the relationship between democratic failure and emergency. We thus bracket
these standard criticisms of Carolene Products, and focus on the special case of the
emergency. Critics of the 9/11 emergency policies argue that judicial review should be
enhanced during the emergency because the probability of democratic failure increases
during an emergency. We are now in a position to see why this argument is unsound.
B. The Carolene Products Theory and Emergencies
The defining characteristic of an emergency is that ordinary life, and the
bureaucratic routines that have been developed to regulate it, are disrupted. In the case of
wars, including the “war on terror,” the government and the public is not aware of a
threat to national security, at time 0. At time 1, an invasion or declaration of war by a
foreign power reveals the existence of the threat, and may at the same time cause
substantial losses. At time 2, an emergency response is undertaken.
Several characteristics of the emergency are worthy of note. First, the threat
reduces the social pie – both, immediately, to the extent it is manifested in an attack, and
prospectively, to the extent that it reveals that the threatened nation will incur further
damage unless it takes costly defensive measures. Second, the defensive measures can be
more or less effective. Ideally, the government chooses the least cost means of defusing
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the threat; typically, this will be some combination of military engagement overseas and
enhanced policing at home. Third, the defensive measures must be taken quickly, and –
because every national threat is unique, unlike ordinary crime – the defensive measures
will be extremely hard to evaluate. There are standard ways of preventing and
investigating street crime, spouse abuse, child pornography, and the like; and, within a
range, these ways are constant across jurisdictions and even nation states. Thus, there is
always a template that one can use to evaluate ordinary policing. By contrast, emergency
threats vary in their type and magnitude, and across jurisdictions, depending heavily on
the geopolitical position of the state in question. Thus, there is no general template that
can be used for evaluating the government’s response.
None of these characteristics are related to the concerns reflected in the Carolene
Products theory. The shrinking of the social pie is something that happens all the time,
due to random exogenous shocks, such as an economic downturn or a bad crop season.
The majority’s reaction to such losses will often be facially neutral policies that may or
may not burden a minority. Under the Carolene Products theory, these polices will not be
checked by courts even if they may cause a disparate impact. In the case of a recession,
the policy may be the reduction of interest rates and the creation of jobs programs. In the
case of an emergency, the policy may be the sealing of borders and the introduction of
new security procedures in airports. Analytically, we have the same case: a policy in
response to a threat.
Crucially, the structure of voting and representation remains the same as it was
before the emergency. The political constraints need not shift,58 even if society as a whole
is poorer than before. The majority has no greater ability to impose costs on a minority in
the emergency case than in the nonemergency case. The structural mechanisms of voting
and representation that are said to produce democratic failure operate the same way both
in emergencies and in normal times. Suppose that the structure of voting and
representation allows a 60% majority to take 80% of the social pie. If an emergency
shrinks the pie, the structure of voting does not change, and the minority will still get its
20%, just of a smaller pie. Perhaps some more elaborate account of democratic failure
might predict that the minority’s share would itself shrink; but any such account would
require a theory running well beyond the simple voting mechanisms that are the stock in
trade of the democratic failure theory.
Sometimes theorists of democratic failure emphasize the worry that minorities
will be subject to “scapegoating” during emergencies. The scapegoating concern is a
hybrid of rational and nonrational accounts of democratic failure, or else equivocates
between the two; it also equivocates among various possible assumptions about the
motives of officials and about the agency slack that officials hold. Sometimes the picture
is of a majority actuated by standing passions or animus against minorities, animus that
remains latent during normal times but that becomes overt during emergencies,
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particularly if minorities are aliens from a country or group that has become an enemy by
virtue of the emergency. Sometimes the picture is that majorities or interest groups harbor
a desire to expropriate the assets of minorities, a desire that is constrained by politics
during normal times but that can be satisfied during emergencies, for unclear reasons. On
either picture, officials implement the majority’s nonrational animus or self-interested
aims through emergency policies. On yet another picture, self-interested officials seize
upon emergencies to scapegoat minorities, as a pretext to expand their own power; in this
version, latent animus present in the population is whipped up by officials who enjoy
some agency slack.
In any of these versions, there is further a question about which groups can be
made into scapegoats. Carolene Products assumes that some set of discrete and insular
minorities can be identified. Talk of scapegoating sometimes makes it sound as though
the choice of targets is entirely unconstrained, so that political entrepreneurs can define
new target groups as emergencies arise, even if the target groups have no relation to the
source of the emergency. It is obvious that there must be some constraints on the choice
of targets – could the class of all left-handed people be made into scapegoats? – but these
constraints are never clearly specified. It is hard to evaluate the scapegoating idea, which
is vague about the mechanisms at work, and which supports no clear predictions about
which groups can be scapegoated, under what conditions.
Whatever sense one attaches to the idea, it is dubious that scapegoating increases
during emergencies. Minorities undoubtedly are scapegoated during emergencies, but
they are during normal times as well, albeit in less visible ways; it is not clear that
emergencies change anything other than the rhetoric or rationalizations surrounding the
majority’s actions. Indeed, as against the view that scapegoating increases during
emergencies, emergencies actually enhance the political position of minorities in several
ways. First, because emergencies capture the attention of the public, it will be more
difficult for the government to conceal oppressive or redistributive policies, making it
easier for minorities to mobilize opposition to such policies. Second, because
redistributive policies create deadweight costs, they become less attractive during
emergencies. When the survival of the pie is at stake, only the most dysfunctional
government will further endanger it by adopting bad policies that ensure that the majority
gets a disproportionate slice. A respectable body of thought holds that nations are most
likely to adopt efficient macroeconomic policies during financial emergencies, and most
likely to adopt inefficient redistributive policies when the nation’s finances are not in
crisis.59 Above, we suggested that emergencies do not change the political constraints
under which majorities and officials operate. Here we suggest, alternatively, that even if
the boundaries of the politically possible do shift, the shift can often help minorities
rather than hurting them. We provide evidence for this suggestion below.
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Are there other possible mechanisms that could cause unjustified discrimination
against minorities to increase during emergencies? No author has concretely identified
such a mechanism; the literature is almost entirely conclusory. To be sure, such
mechanisms could exist. Perhaps emergencies enable groups that during normal times
compete for resources to create temporary majority coalitions because an emergencyrelated minority is a focal point that they can rally around. Perhaps emergencies raise
public awareness and increase public monitoring of politics, so that minorities find it
more difficult to exercise influence to protect themselves behind the scenes. Perhaps
emergencies increase the power of the executive because the legislature rationally
delegates power to it, and then the executive uses its power to exploit minorities. Perhaps
emergencies – in extreme cases – directly interfere with the political process by shutting
down courts, preventing citizens from casting votes, or hindering elected officials from
congregating, whereupon residual power holders exploit minorities. We suggest these
possibilities not because we think they are plausible. All of these theories leave open the
possibility that a minority will itself exploit an emergency by joining the winning
coalition (perhaps with other minorities), rather than being exploited. We suggest these
theories as examples of the type of argument that the critics must come up with before
they can be taken seriously.
So much for theory; what of the evidence? Have democratic failures occurred
more often during emergencies than during normal times? This question is extremely
difficult to answer because of the difficulty of identifying democratic failures and
emergencies in a noncontroversial way. But a few observations can be made.
If we think of democratic failures from the Carolene Products perspective as
large-scale, systematic transfers of wealth from minorities to majorities, then the most
plausible examples of democratic failure in American history are the transfers of land
from American Indians to whites, often in violation of treaties, throughout the nineteenth
century; Jim Crow and other racial structures or policies targeted against AfricanAmericans (especially) and various immigrant minorities such as the Chinese of the west
coast; and the repression of religious minorities such as the Mormons prior to their
migration to Utah. None of these policies were based on an emergency, or justified by
reference to an emergency, unless we define emergency in an implausibly broad sense;60
they were mainly peacetime policies adopted by the national government or the state
governments with the acquiescence of the national government. The view that minorities
are treated worse during emergencies glosses over the long record of democratic failure
during normal times.
Treating these nonemergency deprivations as a baseline, we find it difficult to
find examples of clear democratic failure during war or emergencies. We can generalize
as follows. First, consider cases where the targeted minority was associated in some way
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In some of these case, interested parties justified discriminatory policies by appealing to security
concerns. Long-term concerns about being “overrun” by Chinese immigrants, for example, were mentioned
in the Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). But if
emergency were defined so broadly, then there would be few occasions on which an emergency did not
exist. We offer a narrower definition of emergencies in Part IV.
25

with the enemy. These cases include the treatment of Confederate sympathizers during
the civil war, ethnic Germans during World War I, Eastern European immigrants during
the Red Scare, Japanese-Americans during World War II, Communist sympathizers
during the early cold war, and Arab- and Muslim-Americans since 9/11. In most of these
cases, the connection between the minority group and the enemy, not the political
weakness of the minority group, is the most plausible explanation for the policies in
question: without the benefit of hindsight, and acting in the fog of war, the government
had reasonable grounds to fear that members of the targeted minority would be disloyal.61
Indeed, in the cold war case, the minority was defined by the crisis – those who seemed
sympathetic with the goals of the enemy, the Soviet Union – and not by ethnicity. The
policies adopted during the emergencies may have been wrong, but, if so, of a piece with
the numerous other policies adopted during emergencies that had nothing to do with the
treatment of minorities.
Second, the treatment of minority groups often improves during emergencies;
historically, emergencies have often been an engine of progressive government. Times of
crisis demand good policy. During emergencies the government needs the skills and
loyalty of minority groups, on both the military and economic fronts, and is willing to
pay for them. More broadly, a large body of political theory and science emphasizes that
the military and economic needs of the nation-state have tended, over time, to expand the
scope of the franchise, reduce class privileges, and improve governmental accountability
and the rule of law, because national governments were constrained to offer an everbroader range of groups political benefits commensurate with their political
contributions.62
For examples, consider Lincoln’s decision, at the height of the civil war, to
proclaim emancipation for slaves behind enemy lines, with the hope of enlisting their
sympathies and assistance and of causing disruption to the enemy; the genesis of federal
assistance for minorities in post-Civil War programs, such as the Freedmens’ Bureau; the
creation of national programs for poverty relief during the Depression and New Deal; the
entry of women into the labor force during World War II; the desegregation of schools
and workplaces during the Cold War, and the integration of African-Americans into the
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armed forces during World War II and the Cold War. The last two developments
occurred because a series of national governments saw improving the position of AfricanAmericans as an important part of the propaganda war against communism, and saw
African-Americans as an underutilized pool of capable workers and soldiers.63
This minority-protecting mechanism applies with equal force to emergencyrelevant minorities – the minorities who have some connection to a perceived enemy, and
are thus conspicuous targets for scapegoating. Indeed, even while targeting Arab- and
Muslim-American aliens after 9/11, the U.S. government poured prosecutorial resources
into enforcement of hate crime laws for their protection,64 while the United Kingdom
government enacted a law protecting Muslims from hate crimes in the days immediately
after the 7/7 attacks in London.65 At least in the American case, the government is quite
candid that the struggle against terrorism makes the skills and contributions of Muslim
and Arabic citizens more useful, not more dispensable.66
We do not argue that invidious discrimination systematically tends to decline
during emergencies, though it may. The minimum point we make is that the evidence is
ambiguous: there is no systematic evidence that democratic failures occur more often
during emergencies than during nonemergencies. If we are correct, there is no reason to
believe that an emergency law that targets a minority, even a minority connected to the
crisis, is more likely the result of democratic failure than a non-emergency law that
targets a minority. Democratic failure theorists typically acknowledge the judges’ limited
capacity for handling emergencies. But the critics resist the argument that limited
capacity implies limited deference; to do so they argue that, as a result of scapegoating or
the like, democratic failure is systematically more likely during emergencies. If that were
true, judicial scrutiny might be justified as a way to protect minorities, despite the costs in
reduced security. But it is not true.
The main difference between normal times and emergencies is that courts may
have greater difficulty evaluating an emergency measure than a nonemergency measure,
a point we expand upon in Part IV. The point for now is that there is no reason to think
that democratic failure is more likely to occur during an emergency than during normal
times. It might be the case that government error is more likely during an emergency, but
error by itself is not democratic failure, and courts have no expertise advantage over the
political branches. We now turn to the latter point – the problem of judicial capacities.
IV. DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: CITIZENS, ALIENS, AND JUDGES
In Part III we criticized the idea that democratic failure is more likely during
emergencies than during normal times. We now turn to an improved version of the
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democratic failure theory. On this construal, the theory suggests that democratic failure is
as likely and as damaging in emergencies as in normal times – no more, but certainly no
less.67 On the remedial side, courts in times of emergency should, just as in normal times,
ensure that laws are general, and should strictly scrutinize laws that are facially
discriminatory. Carolene Products applies to the same extent during emergencies as
during normal times.
There is a third possibility, however, the one we propose here: Carolene Products
should not apply during emergencies, or only in weakened form. In Section A, we argue
that even if the Carolene Products theory justifies strict scrutiny of targeted or facially
discriminatory laws during normal times, it does not justify strict scrutiny of such laws
passed in response to emergencies (or, equivalently, strict scrutiny should be easier to
satisfy in emergencies than in normal times). Thus, if courts should strike down statutes
that target minorities during normal times, they should be more deferential during
emergencies. In Section B, we consider what counts as “government”: the Executive
acting alone, or the Executive acting under statutory authorization. We criticize the twin
ideas, sometimes allied with or appended to the Carolene Products theory, that courts
should apply greater scrutiny to executive branch action that is unauthorized by statute,
and that courts have historically done so. In Section C, we consider what counts as an
“emergency,” and who decides whether an emergency is present. In Section D we
consider some distinctive problems concerning aliens, and argue that the Carolene
Products theory does not justify strict scrutiny of laws that burden aliens either during
normal times or during emergencies.
A. Citizens
The democratic failure theory holds that political dissenters and ethnic or racial
minorities are exploited by the majority, and therefore ought to be protected by courts in
normal times. We assume, for the sake of argument, that this theory is correct, and ask, to
what extent does it justify strict scrutiny of targeted or facially discriminatory laws
passed in response to emergencies? We argue that it does not justify strict scrutiny of
such laws; alternatively, if strict scrutiny is adhered to as a nominal framework, claims of
compelling governmental interest should be accepted more readily. Whatever the
doctrinal framework, courts should defer heavily to nongeneral laws passed in response
to emergency.
A preliminary problem is the one we mentioned in Part II. Democratic failure
theories propose that courts should monitor and invalidate policies that impose excessive
security regulation on minorities (defining excessiveness as above) in order to benefit the
majority. No extant theory, however, suggests that courts can or should invalidate
policies that provide excessive liberty or inadequate security. Presumably democratic
failure theorists shy away from the latter problem because judicial review of inadequate
security is infeasible; it would require affirmative judicial oversight of funding and
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regulatory decisions. Given this asymmetry in the structure of judicial review, however, a
rational and ill-motivated government may simply substitute one type of exploitation for
another. If courts block government from pandering to the self-interested majority by
imposing security restrictions on minorities, or if courts make that form of pandering
more costly, then government may switch instruments, pandering to the majority by
spending too little on minorities’ security, or by providing minorities with insufficient
regulatory protection. Substitution of this sort is never costless, so the possibility does not
show that judicial review of excessive security is pointless. The risk of substitution does,
however, reduce the benefits to be gained from judicial review of policies that impose
excessive security restrictions.
Let us now turn to the costs of minority-protecting judicial review; we argue that
these costs rise in times of emergency. To fix ideas, imagine an official racial profiling
policy after 9/11: Arab-Americans are stopped at airports and interviewed and searched at
a higher rate than other Americans. The law that authorizes the profiling explicitly targets
a discrete and insular minority. Under the Carolene Products approach, as normally
understood, the court would apply strict scrutiny. Although it is conceivable that a court
might find that the profiling system is a sufficiently tailored instrument for achieving a
compelling state interest, we know from past experience that this is unlikely. Strict
scrutiny usually means that the law is overturned.
As we noted, emergency policies adopted by the government balance the
competing values of liberty and security. The racial profiling policy affects this balance
in a special way: the reduction in liberty is suffered only by the minority group, while the
benefits from enhanced security are enjoyed by all. The fact that the benefits and burdens
are not equally shared, of course, hardly distinguishes this law from any other. In the case
of ordinary regulatory laws, the numerical minority is outvoted, but the regulations are
accepted because, in some rough sense, the benefits to the majority outweigh the losses to
the minority, and the minority that loses in this case may participate in different
majorities that win in other settings. The mere fact that a particular policy reduces the
liberty of one group in order to enhance the security of another group does not show that
it is the result of a democratic failure. What is special, under the Carolene Products
theory, is not the presence of a law that benefits some and burdens others; it is the
burdening of political dissenters or of a historically oppressed minority group. The
concern is that such a group will repeatedly be on the losing end of the lawmaking
transaction.
This implies that democratic failure is an aggregate theory. To set the benchmark
against which failure is identified, the theory aggregates across a large set of laws, and
finds a democratic failure only if a persistent minority or minority group is repeatedly
sacrificed for the benefit of a persistent majority. Courts, however, must proceed at retail,
examining laws one at a time, and this makes it difficult for courts to implement the
democratic failure theory in any straightforward way. The problem is that, in any given
case, a law that targets some minority or subgroup may be justified by real security
concerns. If it is, then, in an aggregate sense there is no democratic failure, and the law
just is “general” in the sense that the basis for the targeted classification would apply to
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any group that posed a similar security risk. Today’s minorities will benefit from
increased security just as will today’s majority; future laws will be enacted by different
coalitions, in which today’s minority may participate, and those laws will place burdens
on differently-defined minorities.
Courts will often be hard pressed to evaluate whether these conditions hold. But
in times of emergency, this problem of judicial capacity is especially acute. Consider a
simple picture of the judges’ position in normal times, and of their dilemma in times of
emergency. Courts review a law, and either uphold it or strike it down. The law either
reflects a democratic failure or it does not. If the court falsely believes that a law results
from a democratic failure, and strikes it down, then the court commits the type of error
known as a false positive. The law is not the result of a democratic failure; the court
falsely thinks that it is. If the court falsely believes that a law does not result from a
democratic failure, and upholds it, this is a false negative. The law is a democratic failure;
the court falsely thinks it is not. The rational basis test, used for laws that do not target
minorities or facially discriminate, assumes that the social cost of false positives (striking
down legitimate laws) exceeds the social cost of false negatives (upholding illegitimate
laws). Laws that are not targeted or facially discriminatory are presumed to be democratic
successes. If courts were to frequently strike them down, then they would usually strike
down politically valid laws while rarely interfering with a law that is the result of a
democratic failure.
When the law targets dissenters or facially discriminates against a minority, the
strict scrutiny test assumes that the social cost of false negatives exceeds the social cost
of false positives. Laws that are targeted or facially discriminatory are presumed to be
democratic failures. Courts frequently strike them down because in doing so they usually
strike down democratic failures, while rarely interfering with a law that is democratically
valid.
This is the standard Carolene Products picture, but its empirical premises fail in
times of emergency. Both false negatives and false positives have an expected cost,
which is a function of two quantities: the risk of error and the cost of the errors that
occur. The expected cost of false negatives – of erroneously upholding invalid laws – is
the same in emergencies and in normal times. We argued in Part III, and we assume here,
that democratic failure is no more likely in emergencies than in normal times; the costs of
democratic failure that does occur are also constant, because the harm to minorities is the
same in either period.68 But the other side of the ledger is not constant. When an
emergency occurs, the expected cost of false positives – of erroneously striking down
valid laws – increases.
68

There is a ceiling on the amount of harm that can be imposed on minorities during both emergencies and
normal times – deprivation of their lives and their property. This ceiling remains constant across the
emergency and non-emergency settings. The level of actual deprivation in any case depends on the relative
political power of the minorities, to be sure; but if our argument in the text is correct that political
constraints remain constant across settings, there is no reason to believe that deprivations accountable to
democratic failure (as opposed to cost-justified security precautions) are likely to be greater during an
emergency than during normal times. As we noted above, peacetime laws targeting African-Americans,
Mormons, and other minority groups have been just as severe as emergency regulations.
30

We begin by bracketing the risk of false positives and focusing on the social cost
of the false positives that occur. In times of emergency, the law that is invalidated is no
longer a law that makes it easier for police to arrest someone who may rob or kill; the law
that is invalidated is a law that makes it easier for the police to stop a terrorist attack. The
difference in the magnitude of the potential harm goes a long way toward justifying
greater deference in the emergency case, but it is not the only important difference.
Terrorism works not just by killing people but by frightening them, so that they urge
governments to adopt policies that the terrorists want. Ordinary criminals, by contrast, do
not have such a destructive impact on the political process. During an emergency, the
social cost of emergency laws incorrectly struck down is so high that greater deference is
justified.
In some circumstances an erroneous invalidation will merely have a delaying
effect. If an erroneous invalidation produces large costs, government may be able to
adopt the needed measure again, and receive deference from the now-chastened judges.
But delay is also a cost, a cost that rises during emergencies; indeed the higher cost of
delay is a defining trait of emergencies, as we emphasize below. Moreover, delay is a
problem even in a purely ex ante sense. Commentators sometimes suggest that we do not
observe, as a historical matter, judicial protections of liberty that produce serious harms.69
But this overlooks the law of anticipated reactions. If government must worry about
whether its policies will survive judicial review, it will be slower at adjusting to the
emergency; some necessary measures may be foregone altogether, and thus will never
give rise to lawsuits. Fortunately, as we discuss below, the reason that we do not observe
cases in which judicial protection of liberty produces serious harms is that the judges do
not really protect liberty in times of emergency. If they did, they would start to produce
harmful mistakes. The commentators who urge greater judicial vigilance extrapolate from
the historical record of toothless judicial review to predict that judicial review with real
bite would also prove harmless,70 but this is fallacious.
So much for the social cost of false positives; let us turn now to the risk of false
positives. That risk will also be higher during emergencies (unless the judges recognize
the risk and compensate by deferring, as we suggest below they actually do).
Emergencies bring novel threats, and the novel security policies chosen by the
government will be controversial and hard for judges to evaluate. An emergency calls for
large scale reorganization and a change in bureaucratic routines. These routines did not
prevent the emergency, and proved inadequate to cope with it; therefore, they must be
changed. But if they must be changed, then the normal standards for evaluating existing
bureaucratic processes will no longer apply. With hundreds of years of experience, we
know how to determine the fairness of a trial of a person who is suspected of routine
criminal violation. We can complain if the crime rate goes up, police brutalize suspects,
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innocent people are convicted, or the police department consumes more resources than
police departments in other cities. We are much less sure how to evaluate, say, the
conduct of soldiers enforcing martial law. The soldiers are not expected to act like police;
but how should they act? The policies of other countries do not provide a good basis of
comparison because their positions are so different. They have different law enforcement
systems, different levels of social homogeneity, different geopolitical stances, and so
forth.
To be sure, the risk of false negatives will rise as well. If courts have trouble
evaluating an emergency measure for evidence of democratic failure, they will just as
often see success in a democratically invalid law as failure in a democratically valid law.
The important point is that even if both risks increase by the same amount, the expected
cost of false positives will exceed the expected cost of false negatives, because the social
cost of error is higher for false positives (justified security measures struck down) than
for false negatives (minorities unjustifiably harmed). That is why courts should be more
deferential during emergencies than during normal times.
Constitutional lawyers concerned about democratic failure and government
opportunism sometimes emphasize the principle of the “least restrictive alternative.”71
Roughly, the idea is that if government’s goal is to attain a security level of x, and if there
are two policies for attaining x, one that requires sacrificing minorities’ interests and one
that does not, judges will force government to adopt the latter policy. The problem arises
when government claims that, in light of the novelty of the threats and the lumpiness of
the possible responses, the minority-respecting policy will only yield a security level of y,
much lower than x. In emergencies, judges will be hard pressed to evaluate this claim,
and the cost of erroneously rejecting it may be large. The judges know that the
government’s claim may be opportunistic, but that knowledge is not useful, as they
cannot distinguish opportunism from vigilance. In emergencies, the problem for courts is
that they are more likely to make errors when they review emergency laws than when
they review normal laws. This means that strict scrutiny brings with it a higher
probability of false positives as well as a higher social cost when false positives occur.
Carolene Products requires strict scrutiny of laws targeting dissenters or
ideological minorities, not merely of racial and ethnic minorities; where dissenters are
concerned, targeted laws may represent a governmental attempt to close off the “channels
of political change.” But from the judges’ standpoint, the problems are identical;
everything we have said so far applies as well to judicial review of laws that target
dissenters or reduce due process protections for narrowly defined classes of suspects.
Consider, for example, a law that reduces process for all terrorist suspects, regardless of
their race. People who might agree that courts should defer to the government here
frequently argue that courts should not defer to the government if the anti-terrorism law is
facially discriminatory. But the two cases are exactly the same. In both cases, the
standard of review will balance false positives (legitimate laws that are struck down) and
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false negatives (democratic failures that are upheld). In both cases, the false positive is
more costly during an emergency than during normal times. And in both cases, the false
negative is also of substantial concern (an unnecessary burden inflicted on a small group
of people), but is constant across normal times and emergencies. We can think of no
account of democratic failure that would explain why emergencies should cause courts to
scrutinize facially discriminatory emergency laws more strictly than they scrutinize
facially neutral emergency laws that impinge on some constitutionally protected value.
The upshot of this discussion is that courts should more readily uphold targeted or
facially discriminatory security laws passed in response to emergencies than identical
security laws passed during normal times. It is hard to say, in the abstract, how much
more deferential courts should be. At the extreme, courts could simply apply deferential
rational-basis review to all emergency legislation. There is a residuum of factual
uncertainty here, and below we will suggest that emergencies lie on a continuum or
sliding scale, so that the judges will calibrate the deference they afford. What is not
plausible is that courts should use the same approach in both emergencies and normal
times.
Perhaps the best evidence for how the false positives and false negatives net out is
that the judges often believe themselves incapable of evaluating governmental
decisionmaking in times of emergency. Democratic failure theorists often quote Justice
Jackson’s concern for generality, and also his dissenting opinion in the Korematsu case,
which upheld the government’s internment of Japanese aliens and Japanese-American
citizens during World War II.72 Jackson’s Korematsu dissent is usually quoted for his
concern about the ratchet effects of upholding government action during emergencies.73
Yet the core idea of his dissent was arguably different. The core idea was that courts are
incapable of sorting justified from unjustified emergency measures, know themselves to
be incapable, and thus have no real choice but to defer. As Jackson put it:
In the very nature of things military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent
judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on
information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not
be proved. Information in support of an order could not be disclosed to courts
without danger that it would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act on
communications made in confidence. Hence courts can never have any real
alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued the order
that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint.74
In our view, Jackson perfectly captures the institutional dilemma that judges face.
Ought implies can; because the judges can do little to evaluate the need for facially
discriminatory policies in times of emergency, and because the judges know this, there is
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little point asking them to apply genuinely strict scrutiny to such policies. The most that
can be hoped for is ex post compensation where society decides, some generations later
and with the full benefit of hindsight, that the policy was unjustified.75 Such
compensation will often be accompanied by self-castigation or (what is even more
pleasurable) castigation of others, namely the long-dead judges who, it will confidently
be said, violated our commitment to civil liberties. The problem is that, when the next
emergency comes around, the judges will defer again – not to the exact same policy,
because circumstances will always be different, but to a new emergency policy whose
justification the judges know themselves unable to evaluate.76
Conventional wisdom among constitutional lawyers fits this picture; it holds that
courts defer heavily to government in times of emergency.77 (In Section B, we
disaggregate “government” and ask whether this deference occurs even where the
executive acts unilaterally, without authorization from Congress). Given that the history
has been one of judicial deference in times of emergency, we think the burden of factual
uncertainty should be on those who urge courts to abandon this historical posture and
adopt strict scrutiny. The burden is twofold. It is not only to show that genuine strict
scrutiny is desirable, because the expected harms of false negatives will exceed the
expected harms of false positives. It is also to show that real judicial scrutiny of
government action in times of emergency is feasible in a practical sense, given the
institutional dilemma that judges face.
B. “Government”: Congress, the Executive, and Emergencies
So far, we have spoken generally of “government,” and suggested that courts
should defer more heavily to government in times of emergency than in normal times. A
wave of recent scholarship, however, makes a valuable contribution by suggesting that
“government” should be disaggregated. On this view, courts rightly afford more
deference to executive action that is authorized by statute than to freestanding executive
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action.78 We will call this the “authorization requirement,” explore how it might be
combined with Carolene Products review, and express skepticism about it on both
normative and descriptive grounds
Two further distinctions are in order. First, statutory authorization of executive
action may be interpreted as a necessary condition for constitutionality, a sufficient
condition for constitutionality, or both. We are interested only in the possibility that
authorization is a necessary condition. We will suggest that, in times of emergency,
courts should defer even to freestanding executive policies that target dissenters or racial
and ethnic minorities – although we will also claim that there will rarely be any such
freestanding policies, because the same emergency circumstances that produce the
policies also tend to produce statutory authorization for the policies. Second, we will
distinguish descriptive and normative versions of the authorization requirements. One
claim is that courts should require statutory authorization of emergency policies, another
is that courts in practice do so. Typically, however, commentators who advance the
authorization requirement hold both views.
We begin with the normative questions. On our view, the expected costs of
Carolene Products review rise sharply in times of emergency. How can we interpret the
authorization requirement here? The most straightforward interpretation is that the
requirement reduces the risks and costs of the false negative – erroneously upholding
policies that oppress dissenters or discriminate against minorities – because congressional
involvement reduces the number of objectionable policies that are adopted. Congress, on
this view, is a more deliberative institution than is the Executive, and this deliberation
will tend to weed out laws that are bad according to the Carolene Products criteria. The
President is elected by a national constituency on a winner-take-all basis, whereas
Congress is a summation of local constituencies, and thus affords more voice to political
and racial minorities. At the level of political psychology, decisionmaking within the
Executive is prone to group polarization and other forms of groupthink,79 whereas the
internal diversity of legislative deliberation checks these forces. At the level of political
structure, Congress contains internal vetogates and chokepoints – consider the committee
system and the filibuster rule – that provide minorities an opportunity to block harmful
policies, whereas executive decisionmaking is relatively centralized and unitary.
The contrast is drawn too sharply, because in practice the Executive is a they, not
an it. Presidential oversight is incapable of fully unifying executive branch policies,
which means that disagreement flourishes within the Executive as well, dampening
groupthink and providing minorities with political redoubts. For both America and
Britain during World War II, it has been shown that institutional competition within the
executive branch weeded out draconian proposals and thus provided indirect protection
for civil liberties.80 Where a national majority is internally divided, the structure of
presidential politics creates chokepoints that can give racial or ideological minorities
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disproportionate influence, just as the legislative process does. We have already
mentioned the influence of Arab-Americans in Michigan, a swing state.
It is not obvious, then, that statutory authorization makes any difference at all.
One possibility is that a large national majority dominates both Congress and the
Presidency and oppresses minorities, in which case authorization does not help. Another
possibility is that minorities have real influence in both arenas, in which case
authorization is not needed. Authorization only makes a difference in the unlikely case
where the Executive is thoroughly majoritarian while Congress safeguards the interests of
oppressed minorities.
Even if that condition obtains, however, the argument for authorization goes
wrong by failing to consider both sides of the normative ledger. The multiplicity of
vetogates within Congress may allow minorities to block harmful discrimination, but it
also allows minorities to block policies and laws which, although targeted, are
nonetheless good. If Congress is more deliberative, one result will be to prevent
groupthink and slow down stampedes towards bad policies, but another result will be to
delay necessary emergency measures and slow down stampedes towards good policies.
Overall, adding congressional involvement increases the costs of adopting new
emergency policies, and thus has several cross-cutting effects. It reduces the number of
laws that embody unjustified discrimination, which is good, but it also reduces the
number of laws that embody justified security measures targeted against minorities,
which is bad, and it adds delay to the system, which is especially dangerous in times of
emergency. To be sure, the worry that Congress will block needed security measures is
just a possibility, not a systematic empirical finding. Democratic failure theorists,
however, provide little systematic evidence for the assumption that requiring
authorization improves outcomes, on net, because Congress blocks unjustified security
measures. As a normative matter, the requirement of authorization is simply ambiguous.
This point both explains and draws support from congressional practice.
Legislators know that Congress is not well suited for emergency action. Rather than
trying to legislate for emergencies during emergencies, legislators act beforehand,
authorizing the President and executive agencies to act if an emergency arises, and
generally granting them massive discretion.81 Legislative action during emergencies
consists predominantly of ratifications of what the Executive has done; authorizations of
whatever it says needs to be done; and appropriations so that it may continue to do what
it thinks right. Aware of their many institutional disadvantages – lack of information
about what is happening, lack of control over the police and military, inability to act
quickly and with one voice – legislators otherwise confine themselves to expressions of
support or concern. Thus, common factors explain congressional and judicial passivity
during emergencies.
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The assumption that the historical record of emergency-driven ratifications,
authorizations, and appropriations shows that the deliberative processes of Congress have
been engaged, and that therefore executive action based on them, or in some way related
to them, is of higher quality than executive action unauthorized by statute, ought to be
treated with skepticism. The more plausible explanation is that Congress, knowing itself
helpless before the emergency, looks to the Executive for leadership, gratefully defers to
its judgment, and provides it with any legislation that it may desire. On this view,
unauthorized executive action ought to be rare – and indeed it is, as we shall note below.
When it does occur, one does not know whether to blame the Executive for acting hastily
or Congress for failing to overcome its institutional disabilities despite an emergency.
Does the authorization requirement explain judicial practice? The problem with
this claim is that there is little truly unilateral executive action. Qualitative legal analysts
observe that the authorization thesis “fits” a large number of Supreme Court cases
decided during wartime.82 The observation is quite correct, but the comparison group is
too small; we just have too few cases in which the judges were squarely forced to decide
whether statutory authorization is necessary for emergency action by the Executive.83
Part of the problem is that authorization is an endogenous product of the President’s
decision to adopt a given policy, which will often produce authorization from a
cooperative Congress. Consider the Japanese internment policy, which was initially based
upon an executive order, but received statutory ratification from Congress a month
later;84 or Lincoln’s emergency policies, undertaken without statutory authorization in the
early months of the Civil War, which were later ratified by statute.85
More simply, the massive number and scope of statutory delegations since the
New Deal, especially in areas impinging upon national security and foreign policy, means
that there is almost always a statute lurking somewhere in the picture. Judges have
considerable discretion to read statutes more or less broadly, or at higher or lower levels
of generality, so as to suggest that Congress has authorized the executive action. Consider
the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. United States,86 which arguably stretched a general
congressional authorization to use military force by reading it to authorize detention of
U.S. citizens alleged to be enemy combatants, despite the presence of an earlier statute
requiring that detention be specifically authorized.87 A clearer example is Hamdi’s
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predecessor, Ex Parte Quirin,88 in which the Court relied upon a general and non-explicit
statutory provision to find congressional authorization for the President to try U.S.
citizens, accused of being enemy combatants, by military commission.89 Clearest of all is
Dames & Moore v. Regan,90 which threw a set of largely inapposite statutes into a
blender and mixed up an authorization for the President to suspend claims pending in the
United States courts against a foreign nation. Many other cases touching on war, the
military or foreign affairs are similar.91
If judges strain to find statutory authorization for executive action in times of
emergency, why do they do so? We previously described the institutional dilemma facing
judges who must review the Executive’s emergency policies, which the judges lack
competence to evaluate. The judges know that the Executive might be acting
opportunistically or from bad motives, but they also know that the policy might be a
vitally necessary security measure, or was not authorized because Congress moved too
slowly. Worst of all, the judges know they do not know which of these possibilities is
actually the case; they cannot sort opportunism from executive vigor. In a situation of this
sort, the judges will be powerfully tempted to defer, on the one hand, while also finding
some relevant statute to suggest that Congress too has approved the policy, on the other.
The finding of statutory authorization, however strained, is largely costless to the judges,
reassures the public by denying that the Executive is running around without a leash, and
preserves the principle of statutory authorization for a future day on which the judges
might rouse themselves to apply it seriously. The point is not that judges are acting out of
disreputable motives; quite the opposite. On our view, judges tend to defer because the
stakes are high and the judges’ information is poor, and this course is quite sensible.
In decisions of this sort, the statute is not really a moving part, although later
commentators may correctly point out that the judges referred to the statute as authority
for the executive action. Again Korematsu is a good example. Although the internment
order was ratified by a later statute, and although the Court mentioned the statute in
passing, the Court was quite candid that the basis for deference was simply that the
conditions under which the internment order was issued allowed no other course of
action. “Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders – as
inevitably it must – determined that they should have the power to [order internment].
There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered
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that the need for action was great, and time was short.”92 Note the suggestion, very
damaging to the authorization requirement, that the Congress too has little real choice but
to defer to the Executive in times of crisis. If this is so, then we are back to the initial
point that statutory authorization or ratification will predictably be forthcoming during
emergencies, making a judicial requirement of statutory authorization rather hollow.
This is not the whole picture. There are cases in which the Court has construed
statutes narrowly to deny the Executive authority in quasi-military or quasi-emergency
settings.93 On one interpretation, this is especially likely where the President acts contrary
to accepted historical practices and traditions,94 whatever the statutory texts say, which
suggests that statutory authorization is a placeholder for an inquiry that the judges
conduct by using extra-statutory heuristics or rules of thumb. There are also a very few
cases in which the Court seems to have actually taken risks by holding that a sitting
President was adopting emergency policies without statutory (or constitutional) authority.
The Youngstown case,95 in which the Court invalidated Truman’s order taking control of
production at the Nation’s steel mills to prevent a threatened strike, is an example, albeit
a slightly muddy one, because the decision came late in a stalemated foreign war rather
than in a time of genuine emergency.96 The Hamdi decision, on the other hand, is not a
real example of judicial courage, because the decision may well turn out to have been
largely costless to the government. The Court’s holding that the government must afford
some review of citizens’ detentions has yet to be cashed out, and might amount to very
little if review is very deferential and if military tribunals can do the reviewing.
So there are a few cases that do squarely support the authorization thesis, but
there are also a few cases that squarely contradict it. The clearest is In re Debs, in which
the Court granted the President an injunction to continue the operation of the railways in
the face of a massive strike, despite the lack of any statutory authorization at all.97 Debs is
a stark contrast to Youngstown.
The point is not to tote up cases on either side, but to emphasize how few cases
squarely put the authorization thesis to the test. In times of emergency, executive action
and statutory authorization correlate tightly, although not perfectly. This makes it
difficult to falsify our view that statutory authorization is not decisive in most emergency
cases, but it also makes it difficult to falsify the authorization thesis, because we rarely
observe unauthorized executive action. Recall the conventional wisdom, among
constitutional lawyers, that the courts defer heavily to government in times of emergency.
Our suggestion here is that the deference runs mostly to the Executive, not to Congress.
The observation that the authorization thesis fits most of the cases is too fragile to show
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the contrary, because a finding of authorization may often be a rationalization of the
judges’ decision rather than a causal factor in the judges’ decisionmaking, and there are
too few cases to discriminate between the two possibilities.
To sum up: as an alternative to the hypothesis that congressional approval
validates executive action and justifies judicial deference, while congressional silence
justifies judicial scrutiny, we propose the hypothesis that courts and Congress defer to the
Executive during emergencies because their institutional advantages during normal times
are overwhelmed by the Executive’s advantages during emergencies. When the
Executive acts without statutory authorization, this may say more about congressional
incapacity than executive overreaching, and thus courts have no reason to treat
congressional silence as a signal that the executive action is suspect.
C. “Emergencies”
We have suggested that the Carolene Products approach misfires in emergencies,
and that in emergencies judges should defer to laws and policies that would receive strict
scrutiny under normal Carolene Products standards. But two stock questions are, what is
an emergency, and who decides?
As to the first question, the logic of our view is that emergencies lie on a
continuum, or sliding scale. At one end are routine domestic policies adopted in
peacetime, where bureaucracies churn out incremental policy changes, judges repeatedly
see similar issues and become familiar with the costs of blocking or permitting
government action, and the stakes of particular judicial decisions are low. At the other
end are policies adopted in times of fullblown crisis, when it might be reasonable to
believe that serious harms threaten the nation, as in the immediate aftermath of Pearl
Harbor or 9/11. Novel threats, heightened public concern, and deaths arising from hostile
attacks typify these situations; the ordinary routines of bureaucratic policymaking are
suspended, and elected officials quickly intervene to redirect resources and reorient
policies. Time is of the essence, and the stakes of blocking necessary government action
are possibly catastrophic. In between are situations in which government policy is
unusually consequential for foreign policy or for national security, but where some or all
of the features that describe a fullblown emergency are absent. Moreover, emergencies
have a half-life and will decay over time. As time elapses since the beginning of the
emergency, and as enemy attacks or other catastrophic harms dwindle away or stop
altogether, judges will defer less.
The answer to the second question is: it depends. Often, all branches of
government will agree that an emergency exists and the “who decides” question does not
arise. World War II, the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and the early cold war illustrate
this case. The most difficult questions arise when the Executive claims there is an
emergency and the judges disagree. But we have emphasized that this case will be rare,
because judges who are aware of their limited capacity to evaluate the Executive’s claims
will usually defer, although the pressure to defer tends to diminish as the events that gave
rise to the emergency recede. If the Executive branch and the judiciary do disagree, then,
as always is the case with a constitutional crisis, the outcome depends on whether the
public, the elites, or the military have confidence in the Executive or the judiciary. For
example, Lincoln prevailed over Justice Taney at the outset of the Civil War, by defying
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Taney’s habeas corpus order,98 but the executive branch acquiesced in the judiciary’s
skepticism about emergency measures in the second decade of the cold war.
Our argument presupposes that judges are capable of making a second-order
determination whether conditions are such that their own first-order judgments are likely
to be informed and valuable rather than uninformed and irrelevant.99 Cases where judges
determine that their own involvement would not be valuable are common; the political
question doctrine is the conventional illustration. An implication of this view is that the
judges themselves will calibrate deference as events move along the continuum between
normal times and fullblown emergencies. As the urgency of government action increases,
the stakes grow higher, and the costs of frustrating needed security measures grow ever
more daunting, the judges will be more constrained to defer. Conversely, as the
emergency decays, the judges will move back to a less deferential stance. Youngstown
fits this pattern, as does the judges’ increasing assertiveness after the Cold War had
passed its peak.
All this is quite conventional, because constitutional law already requires judges
to determine whether emergency conditions exist, with the most prominent special case
of emergency being war. Consider doctrines holding that contract and property rules may
be abrogated or limited in times of emergency,100 doctrines that grant government
heightened “war power,”101 and doctrines that grant the President “protective” powers
where Congress is not in session, or emergency legislation has not yet been put in place,
or existing law somehow contains gaps that have been exposed by novel threats. The
questions “what is an emergency and who decides” are questions to which constitutional
law already provides answers. What we add to this conventional doctrine is that Carolene
Products review is no more immune to the pressure of emergency than is any other
approach to judicial review. Even targeted laws and policies that would receive strict
Carolene Products scrutiny in a normal setting will receive deference in times of
emergency, as the judges define it.
D. Aliens
The foregoing points apply to all kinds of Carolene Products review during times
of emergency, whether conducted to protect resident aliens and other nonvoters, or to
protect political and ethnic minorities among the citizenry. Here we round out our
account by considering some distinctive problems that involve aliens. The connection to
emergencies is that such problems, although always present, become more focal and
more urgent during emergencies.
At first sight, the Carolene Products argument seems even stronger when applied
to aliens than when applied to political or ethnic minorities. Since the end of Jim Crow,
African-Americans have had the right to vote, both de jure and de facto. Hispanics have
significant and increasing political power. Even Arab-Americans have substantial
political power. Aliens, by contrast, have no right to vote. Because they cannot vote, they
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cannot directly affect political outcomes, and thus would seem especially vulnerable to
exploitation by the majority. Courts, on the Carolene Products theory, should offer aliens
maximal protection by applying strict scrutiny to laws that discriminate against people on
the basis of alienage. Such reasoning seems to have influenced the House of Lords, which
recently struck down a British law that permitted the Home Secretary to detain without
trial foreign nations who pose a terrorist threat.102 The court singled out the law’s facial
discrimination against aliens; it did not apply to British nationals.103
There are several reasons for doubting the application of the Carolene Products
theory to aliens. Initially, the argument raises the puzzle of why America’s duties to
aliens are so much greater when the aliens reside in American territory than when they
reside in their home countries. It is uncontroversial that the U.S. government has much
less responsibility over the welfare of aliens living in foreign countries than it has over
American citizens, here and abroad. It is also relatively uncontroversial that the U.S.
government need not respect the rights of foreign citizens living abroad to the same
extent that it must respect the rights of American citizens. And no one thinks that
foreigners should have the right to vote in American elections even though American
foreign policy heavily influences their interests.104 Thus, the question is why all this
should change merely because a foreigner crosses the American border.
One possible answer is that it is easier for the U.S. government to protect people
on its own territory than people who live abroad. But the U.S. government goes to great
effort to protect Americans living abroad. Whatever the practical and logistical
differences, they are not extreme enough to justify such a great difference between the
treatment of aliens abroad and the treatment of aliens on American soil.
Another possible answer is that the U.S. government does not have any special
duties toward aliens generally, but only for aliens who reside in the United States for a
sufficiently long period of time – resident aliens. We will address this argument below.
For now, it is important to note that if this view implies that Carolene Products should
protect resident aliens but not nonresident aliens, then much of the criticism of the U.S.
government’s 9/11 policy loses its force. Except for the interviews, that policy did not
target resident aliens; its brunt was borne by nonresident aliens, who were rounded up
and deported if their papers were not in order.
The second reason for doubting the application of the Carolene Products theory
to alienage is that the treatment of aliens is not as bad as that theory implies would be the
case for a group that lacks the franchise. This is true in the United States, even though
constitutional protections of aliens are far less than would be required by Carolene
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Products; and this is true in foreign countries where there are no constitutional rights to
speak of at all. During normal times, aliens who are on American territory are not taxed
any more heavily than Americans are; they are not deprived of legal protections; they are
not mistreated or discriminated against in any overt way, unlike African-Americans
during the Jim Crow era. The post 9/11 emergency did not lead to discrimination against
aliens qua alien; it led to discrimination against only certain aliens – those with some
connection to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with a significant
Muslim or Arab population. And although aliens from these countries were subject to
more discrimination than American citizens who share their national origin, that was
surely because aliens are assumed to be loyal to their home countries, whereas
immigrants are assumed to be loyal to the U.S. Whatever one thinks about ethnic or
religious discrimination of this sort, it is clear that the government did not use 9/11 as a
pretext to discriminate against alienage as such; for if it did so, it would not have limited
discrimination to only these aliens.
Why don’t states engage in greater discrimination against aliens? A fallacy in the
Carolene Products view is to overlook that the welfare of aliens is itself a component of
the welfare of the voting majority, so the self-interest of the majority need not produce
exploitation of the minority. The welfare of aliens enters the welfare function of the
voting majority in several ways.
First, the voting majority wants foreigners to come to their country – as tourists,
who consume goods and services; as students, who pay tuition; and as employees, who
bring needed skills. The voting majority hopes that some of these aliens will eventually
settle and become citizens. States attract aliens by providing an environment in which
discrimination against aliens is discouraged. If states regularly discriminate against
aliens, people will be less likely to come. It is this exit option – or the option not to enter
– that, as we will discuss shortly, ensures that aliens’ interests are respected by
governments.
Second, recent immigrants maintain family and ethnic ties to aliens, and object
when these aliens are subjected to government discrimination. Mexican-Americans, for
example, protested when the American government adopted harsh border control
strategies that affected only Mexican nationals and not Mexican-Americans. Clearly,
Mexican-Americans worried about the effect of these strategies on friends, relatives, and
coethnics who had not been naturalized. Arab-Americans objected to many of the 9/11
strategies that affected only Arab aliens, not Arab-Americans. Its tradition of welcoming
immigrants and its mosaic of ethnic groups ensure that, in the United States, aliens are
treated quite well.
Third, the voting majority itself travels abroad, becoming aliens in other
countries, and knows that their good treatment in foreign countries depends on good
treatment of aliens in the United States. If the U.S. wants to protect Americans abroad, it
must promise to protect aliens on American soil. Thus, we can see the mechanism by
which aliens obtain political power in the United States. The millions of Americans who
enter foreign countries as tourists, students, and employees are members of the
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“majority” who, under the Carolene Products theory, have disproportionate influence on
government policy. This majority lobbies the U.S. government to ensure that foreign
governments do not engage in unreasonable discrimination against them. The foreign
governments demand in return that the U.S. government not engage in unreasonable
discrimination against aliens on American soil. These understandings are embodied in
countless international conventions and treaties which oblige states to extend various
protections to aliens on their soil, reflecting the simple reciprocal logic of alienage.105
Thus, indirectly, aliens have quite substantial political influence in the United States.
A small but telling example of the power of reciprocation occurred in the wake of
9/11. In order to enhance control of migration, the U.S. government required that aliens
entering American territory be fingerprinted. This was a small imposition, but enough to
generate retaliation by states that believed that the American response was unreasonable.
Brazil, for example, retaliated by requiring that Americans entering Brazil be
fingerprinted.106 Other states confined themselves to diplomatic protest, but even
diplomatic protest cannot be ignored. The U.S. needed to decide whether fingerprinting
was important enough that it would be willing to tolerate fingerprinting of Americans, or
other intrusive security measures, when Americans entered other countries. Whatever the
right decision, our point is that aliens do not lack influence on the American government
despite their disenfranchisement. They have influence because Americans are
disenfranchised in foreign countries.
There are many other examples of this phenomenon. The Mexican government
has joined Mexican-Americans in protesting America’s treatment of Mexicans, including
its border control policies and the application of the death penalty to Mexicans convicted
of capital crimes. Indeed, Mexico brought proceedings against the United States in the
International Court of Justice, arguing that the United States violated the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations by failing to notify several dozen Mexican nationals of
their right to seek advice from the Mexican consulate after they were arrested for
committing serious crimes.107 Germany and Paraguay brought similar proceedings
against the U.S.108 Conversely, the U.S. has protested when Americans are treated poorly
in other states.109
To sum up the argument so far, various factors ensure that governments do not
treat aliens much more harshly than their own citizens. The most important, in our view,
is the implicit contractual relationship between the alien and the host government – one
that is enforced by the alien’s exit option and the alien’s own government. In order to
105
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attract and retain aliens who have valuable skills or resources, governments must treat
aliens relatively well. This is not to say that this mechanism is perfect. Some
governments might not bother to protect their citizens abroad; some governments may be
unable to maintain a consistent policy toward aliens; and so forth. But democracy is far
from perfect also, and people who are in a political minority but not a “suspect class”
entitled to special constitutional protections will often find that the government ignores
their interests.
We mentioned above that one might make a distinction between a nonresident
alien and a resident alien. Joseph Carens, for example, makes the apparently logical
argument that a democracy exists only if government policy rests on the consent of the
governed; resident aliens, unlike foreign tourists or students, are governed in their
everyday lives by the law of the state in which they live; therefore, resident aliens ought
to have all the rights of citizens, including even the right to vote.110 If they are
nonetheless deprived of the right to vote, the Carolene Products theory would seem to
provide a case for strict scrutiny of laws that discriminate against them.
This argument is flawed. A resident alien is simply at the midpoint between a
nonresident alien and a citizen. Unlike a nonresident alien, the resident alien has
numerous local ties (employers, friends, perhaps relatives) who will support the resident
alien’s interests in the political arena. This kind of “virtual representation” is not
sufficient in itself, of course; but, in addition, the resident alien, unlike the nonresident
alien, can expect to have the right to vote after the period of naturalization is over. A
government that discriminates against resident aliens today takes the risk of negative
votes tomorrow. Further, unlike a citizen, the resident alien retains the exit option, even if
stronger local ties and weaker foreign ties make it less valuable for the resident alien than
for the nonresident alien. And, unlike a citizen, the resident alien retains for the short
term a “foreign” vote that, as long as the alien’s government is democratic, can be used to
cause the alien’s government to influence the host government’s policies toward aliens.
Thus, the resident alien has three weak instruments for influencing the host government
(weak exit option, future vote, current “foreign” vote), whereas the citizen has one strong
instrument (vote); but these three weak instruments may well be as good as one strong
instrument. Finally, governments have an interest not only in attracting aliens, but also in
encouraging some of them to become permanent residents. Aliens can choose for
themselves whether they prefer to become residents or not. If the government
unreasonably discriminates against resident aliens, then aliens – prior to become residents
– can take this into account.
All of these considerations fade when our focus turns from resident aliens to the
children of resident aliens. Children – especially children raised in the host state – will
have strong ties with the host state, and thus their exit option will be weak. Once they
become adults, they are in the position described by Carens: subject to regulation, and
therefore entitled to representation. Happily, in the U.S. such children automatically
obtain citizenship, however; so the Carolene Products problem does not come into
110
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existence. This leaves only the case of people who are born abroad, brought to the U.S. as
young children, and then raised in the U.S. These people have strong ties to the U.S., no
ties to foreign nations, and no vote. This small class of people could potentially be
brought under the Carolene Products umbrella, though again, as far as we know, they are
not subject to the kind of intensive discrimination that motivates the theory of strict
scrutiny.
Marginal cases aside, the extension of the Carolene Products theory from local
minorities to aliens is unsound. Aliens, unlike ethnic or religious minorities, have an exit
option and enjoy the protection of foreign governments. Although these advantages may
not necessarily be more valuable than the right to vote in American elections (though
they may be), the right to vote is not the appropriate baseline because aliens do not
belong to the demos, or do so only in a limited and imperfectly understood fashion. In the
terms we have used here, strict review of laws and policies targeting aliens is unjustified.
CONCLUSION
We began with a simple view of security and liberty. This view suggests that a
rational and well-motivated government will engage in “first-order balancing”111 of the
value of security and liberty, recalibrating the level at which both goods are provided as
circumstances change over time. The major criticisms of this view are the panic theory,
which we have considered elsewhere, and the democratic failure theory, whose legal
corollary is Carolene Products.
There is no need to repeat our criticisms of the democratic failure theory; but we
will underscore the consequences of rejecting it. If the panic theory is off the table, and if
Carolene Products review comes unstuck in times of emergency, we are back to firstorder balancing. A model judicial opinion for our view is Dennis v. United States, which
applied first-order balancing of liberty interests and security needs to uphold the
convictions of Communists who advocated the overthrow of the United States
government. 112 As in Korematsu, Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Dennis explains the
institutional dynamics that make deference predictable in this sort of case:
If we must decide that this Act and its application are constitutional only if we are
convinced that petitioner’s conduct creates a ‘clear and present danger” of violent
overthrow, we must appraise imponderables, including international and national
phenomena which baffle the best informed foreign offices and our most
experience politicians. . . . No doctrine can be sound which requires us to make a
prophecy of that sort in the guise of a legal decision. 113
The Court later disavowed or limited Dennis by construing the relevant anti-Communist
statutes more narrowly,114 and eventually by announcing a tighter constitutional test.115
An important defense of this sequence portrays it as the development of a sort of
“second-order balancing,” one which places a libertarian thumb on the scales of the first111
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order balance to compensate for predictable pressures towards deference.116 In our view,
the sequence is just part of the cycle of libertarian self-castigation that arises whenever
the emergency has passed. Faced with a violent conspiracy of great but uncertain
magnitude, governments will predictably strike, and judges will predictably allow them
to do so, in part because they appreciate the institutional dilemma that Jackson outlines in
Dennis and Korematsu. This sequence is neither irrational nor ill-motivated. Later
generations will bemoan the violation of liberty, but that will not prevent yet later
generations from doing the same when the hour of emergency comes round again.
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